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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20151060-CA
TY WILLIAM MCLEOD,
Appellant is not incarcerated.
Defendant/Appellant.
vJJ

INTRODUCTION
Police Officer Lampshire initiated a traffic stop after he observed Ty McLeod
merge into traffic without signaling. He approached McLeod, obtained his identifying
information, and went back to his police car to conduct a records check. Lampshire
confirmed that McLeod had a valid driver's license and no outstanding warrants, but was
unable to determine proof of valid insurance. He also observed McLeod "moving all
around," which according to Lampshire, raised officer safety concerns.
Officer Lampshire once again approached McLeod, however, he did not issue a
warning, citation, or otherwise address the failure to signal and lack of insurance
infractions. Instead, Lampshire twice-asked whether McLeod possessed anything illegal,
sought and obtained consent to search the car, and performed a Terry 1 frisk. A
subsequent search of the car revealed heroin.

1

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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On appeal, McLeod challenges the trial court's order denying his motion to
suppress. Although the court correctly concluded that Lampshire lacked reasonable
suspicion of new criminal activity, it erroneously concluded that the scope and duration
of the traffic stop was reasonable. Specifically, McLeod argues that Lampshire
impermissibly detoured from his traffic-related mission when he asked unrelated
questions and performed a Terry frisk without justification; this detour exceeded the
scope and duration of the traffic stop and constituted an unlawful seizure. And because
McLeod was illegally seized and his consent to the search was obtained by Lampshire's
exploitation of the unlawful detention, the trial court's order must be reversed.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-4103(2)(e). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment).
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying McLeod's motion to suppress

where police extended a routine traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to ask
unrelated questions and conduct a Terry frisk in violation of the Fourth Amendment's
proscription of unreasonable seizures.
Standard o(Review: This Court reviews "a trial court's decision to grant or deny a

motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation as a mixed question of
law and fact." State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ill 7, 332 P.3d 937. "While the [trial] court's
factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness, including its application of law to the facts of the case." Id.
2
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Preservation: This issue was preserved. R.68-69, 80-82, 87-92; Addendum C
~

(defendant's motions to suppress); R.95-101; Addendum C (State's response); R.115-19,
230-48; Addendum D (court's findings and conclusions denying defendant's motions to
~

suppress); R.160-191, 229-248; Addendum E & F (hearing and argument on defendant's
motions to suppress).

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following are attached at Addendum B: U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

"

Factual History
On March 7, 2014, Salt Lake City Police Officer Lampshire was patrolling the 500
West 200 South area when he noticed a vehicle parked in the middle median of the street.

ViP

R.165-67. The driver, Ty McLeod, exited the vehicle, 'jaywalk[ed]" across the street, and
approached three persons who "started pointing that the cops were right there." R.166-68.
McLeod then walked around the comer and Officer Lampshire lost sight of him. R.168.
Officer Lampshire waited for McLeod to return. R.168. When McLeod got back to
his car and drove away, Lampshire initiated a traffic stop after he observed McLeod
v;P

merge into traffic without signaling. R.168, 175. Officer Lampshire activated his lights
and McLeod pulled to the side of the road. R.168-69. Upon approaching the car,
Lampshire explained why he had pulled McLeod over. R.169. He then asked to see
McLeod's driver's license, proof of insurance, and registration. R.169. McLeod was
unable to produce those documents, but he provided Officer Lampshire with his
identifying information. R.169, 175-76.
3
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Lampshire returned to his police vehicle to run McLeod's information, and a
second policeman, Officer Steenblik, arrived on the scene. R.169, 187. While Lampshire
was unable to determine proof of valid insurance, he confirmed that McLeod had a valid
driver's license and no outstanding warrants. R.169, 174, 176-77. However, he did not

'1ll

draft any written citation or warning for the lack of insurance or the failure to signal
violation. R.177-78. Officer Lampshire also acknowledged that there was nothing about
the records check that suggested McLeod was a violent person. R.176-77. And despite his
recognition that motorists sometimes continue to look for their documents when unable to
initially produce them, Lampshire testified that he became concerned for his and Officer
Steenblik's safety upon observing McLeod "moving all around." R.169-70, 176.
Once again, Lampshire approached McLeod on the driver's side while Officer
Steenblik stood on the passenger side. R.169-70. Lampshire recognized that "[i]n [terms
of] the traffic stop," he was limited to issuing a citation or a warning at that point. R.18586. However, Lampshire did not give a citation, a warning, or otherwise tell McLeod he
was free to leave. R.178-79.
Instead, Officer Lampshire asked McLeod ifhe had anything illegal with him.
R.184, 187. When McLeod responded no, Lampshire next sought permission to search
the vehicle. R.184, 187. McLeod said "yes" or "sure." R184, 187. At that point, Officer
Lampshire observed McLeod "trying to put his hands up underneath some clothing ... on
the passenger seat." R.170, 187. Officer Steenblik ordered him to "stop that" or "keep
[your] hands where [I can] see them." R.170, 187. McLeod complied. R.177.

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

Officer Lampshire then directed McLeod to exit his car and inquired as to whether
he had any weapons on him. R.170, 187. McLeod said no. R.170. Subsequently, Officer
Lampshire performed a Terry frisk, which did not reveal weapons or anything else of
evidentiary value. R.170, 187. Lampshire testified that McLeod was "detained" but "not
under arrest" when he requested that McLeod step out of the vehicle. R.170-71.
After completing the frisk, Officer Lampshire again asked if there was anything
~

illegal in the car. R.171, 184-85,187-88. McLeod indicated that "he had a syringe,"
which Lampshire understood to mean drug paraphernalia. R.171-72, 184-85, 188. Up

vi

until this point, Lampshire estimated that about 10 minutes had elapsed from when he
first initiated the traffic stop. R.189. Lampshire's emergency lights were activated for the
stop's duration. R.190.
Lampshire subsequently directed McLeod to sit on a nearby curb while he
proceeded to search the vehicle. R.172. Officer Lampshire found a syringe containing
liquid heroin as well as a "twist" of heroin within a shoe inside the car. R.172-74, 188.
He also recovered two "twists" of heroin from the car's center console. R.172-74, 188.
McLeod was arrested and his girlfriend or wife, the vehicle's registered owner, was
contacted and retrieved the car. R.174-75, 189.
Procedural History
On March 18, 2014, McLeod was charged by Information with possession or use
of a controlled substance (heroin), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code § 5837-8(2)(a)(i), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation

v1'
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of Utah Code§ 58-37a-5(1). R.1-2. He waived a preliminary hearing and was bound over
Wv

on both charges. R.55-56.
McLeod filed a motion to suppress based on violations of the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. R.68-69, 80-82, 87-92; Addendum C. Specifically, he argued
that he was unlawfully detained beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion. Id. An evidentiary hearing was subsequently held on August 27,
2015. R.85-87, 160-220; Addendum E. 2 Following testimony and argument, the district
court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R.115-19, 230-48; Addendum
D. The court concluded that "[u]p until the moment that Defendant indicated he had a
syringe in his shoe, there was no basis presented to justify either reasonable suspicion or
probable cause for investigation of any activity beyond the observed traffic violation."
R.117. Nevertheless, the court denied McLeod's motion. R.115-19; 242-48. The court
reasoned that the scope of the stop was not unlawfully extended because Officer
Lampshire could have issued a citation for McLeod's lack of insurance, "which would
have taken at least as much time as the Terry frisk" and the officer's questioning R.11718.
McCleod subsequently pleaded guilty to possession or use of a controlled
substance, a class A misdemeanor, reserving his right to appeal the court's denial of his
motion to suppress pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988). R.122-23, 1282

McLeod points out that he currently has an appeal pending in another case (Case
No. 20151062-CA), which also involves Officer Lampshire and challenges the trial
court's order denying his motion to suppress. Below, both cases were treated separately,
but were addressed at the same evidentiary and motion hearings.
6
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32. The court sentenced McLeod to 365 days in jail, suspended, and placed him on
probation for 18 months. R.130-32. McLeod timely appealed. R.142-43.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

A traffic stop must be limited in scope to tasks related to its mission. These tasks
may include writing a warning or citation, checking a driver's license, checking the
driver for warrants, and verifying vehicle registration and insurance. An initially lawful
traffic stop may be converted to an unlawful seizure if it exceeds the scope of the stop, or
if it extends longer than necessary to accomplish the permissible tasks of the stop.
Here, the lawful scope and duration of the initial traffic stop was exceeded when
Officer Lampshire detoured from his traffic-related mission in order to ask unrelated
questions and Terry frisk McLeod without reasonable suspicion of new criminal activity.
Suppression is warranted because McLeod was seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and his consent to the search was obtained via Lampshire's exploitation of
the unlawful detention. Thus, the trial court's denial of McLeod's motion to suppress the
illegally obtained evidence requires reversal.
ARGUMENT
~

Officer Lampshire Unlawfully Extended The Scope And Duration Of The Traffic
Stop In Order To Ask Unrelated Questions And Conduct A Terry Frisk Without
Reasonable Suspicion; Thus, Suppression Of The Illegally Obtained Evidence Is
Required.

4'
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from '"unreasonable searches and
seizures."' State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, iJl 0, 229 P.3d 650 (quoting U.S. Const. amend
~

IV). "'The touchstone of a court's Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness, which
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is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."' Id.
(quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
routine traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment "even though the purpose of
the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653 (1979). The seizure begins "the moment ... [the] car c[omes] to a halt on the
side of the road," Brend/in v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007), and "ordinarily
continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson, 555
U.S. 323, 325 (2009).
Utah applies "a two-step test to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,r12. First, the court will determine
whether the officer was "justified at [the] inception" of the traffic stop in detaining the
vehicle. Id. Second, the court will determine "whether the detention following the stop
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the
first place." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining the reasonableness of
the stop's scope and duration, courts look to "the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the stop." Id. ,r17.
In this case, McLeod was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when Officer Lampshire pulled him over for failing to signal. McLeod does not challenge
the validity of Lampshire's justification for initially stopping him. However, McLeod
argues that, under the second step, the lawful scope and duration of the initial stop was
exceeded when Lampshire asked unrelated questions and conducted a Terry frisk without
justification. See infra Part I.A. Moreover, the evidence seized requires suppression
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

because McLeod's consent to search was the product of Lampshire's exploitation of the
illegal seizure. See infra Part I.B. Thus, the trial court incorrectly denied McLeod's
motion to suppress, and its order must be reversed.
A. Officer Lampshire exceeded the lawful scope and duration of the initial traffic
stop when lte asked unrelated questions and conducted a Terry frisk wit/tout
reasonable suspicion of new criminal activity.

A routine traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription against
~

unreasonable seizures when '"it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to
complete th[ e] mission"' of addressing the traffic violation and any "related safety
concerns." Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1612, 1614 (2015). In other
words, "[ o]nee a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."' State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,
1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
The "[a]uthority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction areor reasonably should have been-completed." Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614; Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,407 (2005) (noting "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the
interest in issuing a ... ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond
the time reasonably required to complete that mission."). Typically, the mission of a
police officer during a routine traffic stop "includes checking the driver's license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
automobile's registration and proof of insurance"; these checks "ensur[ e] that vehicles on
the road are operated safely and responsibly." Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615 (noting
"[t]hese checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code"). And while
9

0Y

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to "conduct certain unrelated checks during an
WI

otherwise lawful traffic stop," "he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent .
. . reasonable suspicion." Id.
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Rodriguez sheds light on
activities that may exceed the lawful duration and scope of a traffic stop. In that case, the
Court held that under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer conducting a traffic stop
may not prolong the stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.
See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 1609. This is because a dog sniff falls outside of "'ordinary

inquiries incident"' to a traffic stop, addressing neither officer safety nor highway safety
concerns. Rodriguez at 1615-1616. And the Fourth Amendment does not permit "onscene investigation into other crimes"-including "safety precautions taken in order to
facilitate" such investigation- that "detour[] from" the mission of the traffic stop.
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.

The Court noted that its holding "adhere[d] to the line drawn in [Illinois v.
Caballes]" where it held that "a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not

violate the Fourth Amendment[]." Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612 (holding dog sniff
unconstitutional where it unlawfully extended duration of traffic stop). But the Court
disagreed that this meant that "an officer may 'incremental[ly]' prolong a stop to conduct
a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent ... , and the overall duration of the
stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar
circumstances." Id. at 1616. Indeed, the Court rejected the idea that "an officer can earn
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bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation" if he "complet[es] all trafficrelated tasks expeditiously." Id. at 1616.
Instead, the Supreme Court emphasized that the "critical question" is not when the
dog sniff occurs "but whether conducting the sniff 'prolongs '-i.e., adds time to-'the
stop."' Id. It also explained that the reasonableness of a detention is measured based on
"what the police in fact do." Id. Ultimately, the Court held that the dog sniff was
unconstitutional because it unlawfully prolonged the duration of traffic stop.
Likewise, in State v. Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the officer
unlawfully prolonged the duration and scope of the initial traffic stop to question the
defendant about alcohol, drugs, and weapons. 2002 UT 125, ,r,r27-46, 63 P.3d 650. In that
case, police stopped the defendant for a lane change violation and for lack of insurance.
Id. at ,r,r6-8. After the officer conducted a computer check, which confirmed that the

defendant had a valid driver's license and no outstanding warrants, the officer verbally
0i

admonished the defendant to obtain insurance and returned his documents. Id. at ,r,r9-12.
The officer next asked the defendant if "he had any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in his
vehicle." Id. at if 13. The defendant said no. Id. The officer then asked ifhe could search
the vehicle and the defendant gave consent. Id. at ,r,r13-15, 48-50.
The Hansen court explained that "after [the officer] verified Hansen's license and

VI

registration and completed a computer check, the purpose for the initial traffic stop was
concluded. Id. at if32. However, the court determined that the officer unlawfully
prolonged the stop "by questioning Hansen about whether he had alcohol, drugs, or
weapons in his vehicle and by asking if he could search his vehicle for these items." Id.
11
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,r,r31-32 ("Any further temporary detention for investigative questioning after [fulfilling]
the purpose for the initial traffic stop constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality" (alteration original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Utah Supreme Court concluded that "the scope
of questioning exceeded, without justification, the purpose of the initial traffic stop." Id.
iJ32.
As these cases suggest, authority for a seizure ends when an officer has-or
reasonably should have-completed his traffic-related tasks and no other justification for
continuing the detention exists. An officer exceeds the lawful scope of a traffic stop when
he adds time to a stop in order to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation without
reasonable suspicion. Here, Officer Lampshire unlawfully exceeded the scope and
duration of the traffic stop by conducting a Terry frisk and pursuing a line of questioning
beyond ordinary, traffic-related inquiries. The officer also lacked a proper justification
for doing so.
The traffic stop in this case was initiated after Lampshire observed McLeod merge
into traffic without signaling. R.168, 175. The tolerable scope and duration of the stop
was therefore limited to completing the tasks tied to the traffic infraction. See Rodriguez,
135 S. Ct. at 1615 (explaining that tasks tied to a traffic infraction include "determining
whether to issue a traffic ticket" and other "ordinary inquiries incident to" a traffic stop,
such as "checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding
warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of
kv

insurance.").
12
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Once McLeod had pulled over, Officer Lampshire approached and asked to see
McLeod's driver's license, proof of insurance, and registration. R.169. McLeod was
unable to produce those documents, but provided Lampshire with his identifying
information. R.169, 175-76. Back at his police car, Officer Lampshire ran McLeod's
information. R.169, 187. While he was unable to determine proof of insurance, he
confirmed that McLeod had a valid driver's license, no outstanding warrants, and that the
vehicle was registered. R.116, 169, 176-77.
As in Hansen, "after [Officer Lampshire] verified [McLeod's] license and
registration and completed a computer check, the purpose for the initial traffic stop was
concluded. Id. at if32. At that point, Lampshire had the limited authority to give a written
or verbal citation or warning or give no citation at all. 3 Officer Lampshire, however, did
not issue a citation or warning for McLeod's failure to signal violation or his lack of
insurance. R.177-79. In fact, he chose not to address the infractions at all. See id. Thus,
when Lampshire decided to do nothing in regards to the traffic infractions and abandon
his traffic-related mission, his authority to seize McLeod ended. See Rodriguez, 135 S.
Ct. at 1615.
~

Officer Lampshire, however, unlawfully "add[ed] time to[] 'the stop"' by
pursuing a line of unrelated questioning and conducting a Terry frisk. Id. at 1616. These
3

Tellingly, Officer Lampshire recognized that in the context of the traffic stop,
these were the tasks he was limited to. R.185-186. Defense counsel asked: So ... at that
point, it was either write the citation or give him a warning or do something ... ; correct?"
Id. Lampshire first responded "well, not with that area," but nevertheless recognized that
in terms of "the traffic stop, yes." Id. Lampshire's "not with that area comment" suggests
that he was conducting a drug and weapons investigation instead of limiting his tasks and
investigation to the traffic infraction.
13
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tasks cannot be characterized as part of Lampshire's traffic mission as they lacked a
"close connection to roadway safety." Id. at 1615. Rather, they were aimed towards
Lampshire's investigation into "other" drug and weapons related offenses. Id. at 1616.
Similar to the officer's impem1issible questioning in Hansen, the illegal detention
began when Officer Lampshire asked McLeod ifhe had anything illegal with him. 2002
UT 125, if69; R.184, 187. When McLeod responded no, Lampshire next asked for
permission to search the car. R184, 187. But Lampshire exceeded the stop's scope even
further than the officer in Hansen when he asked McLeod ifhe had any weapons on him,
proceeded to conduct a Terry frisk, and inquired for a second time as to whether McLeod
had anything "illegal." R.170-71, 184-85, 187-88. Thus, as in Hansen, Officer Lampshire
unlawfully prolonged the stop by "questioning" McLeod about whether he had any
weapons or anything illegal, "by asking if he could search his vehicle," and by
performing a Terry frisk. 2002 UT 125, ,r,r31-32.
The trial court's reasoning to the contrary was incorrect. Relying on Hansen, the
court concluded that the seizure was lawful because Officer Lampshire could have issued
a citation for McLeod's lack of insurance, "which would have taken at least as much time
Ii,

as the Terry frisk" and the officer's questioning. R.117-18; Addendum D. The Hansen
court, however, did not reach its conclusion by temporally comparing the duration of the
officer's unrelated questions against the time it "would have taken" to pursue lawful,
traffic-related tasks under comparable circumstances. See 2002 UT 125, ,r,r27-32. Rather,
Hansen stands for the proposition that an officer who has completed or abandoned his

14
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traffic-related mission cannot add time to a traffic stop to investigate other criminal
activity absent new reasonable suspicion. See id.

4

The trial court's reasoning is also at odds with the Court's decision in Rodriguez,
which rejected the argument that a seizure is lawful if the officer is "reasonably diligent
... , and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of
other traffic stops involving similar circumstances." 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (emphasis added);
see also id. (disagreeing with the notion that "an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an
unrelated criminal investigation" ifhe "complet[es] all traffic-related tasks
expeditiously"). Rodriguez made clear that the reasonableness of a detention "depends on
what the police in fact do"; reasonableness is not measured by "other," comparable traffic
stops or what an officer hypothetically could have done in the amount of time he elected
to devote to a separate criminal investigation. Id. at 1616.
Nevertheless, the trial court in this case looked at the length of time "it would have
taken to write a citation had the officer proceeded to do so for Defendant's lack of
insurance." R.118; Addendum D. But, Officer Lampshire did not write a citation during
the timeframe at issue. Id. at 1616. "[W]hat [Lampshire] in fact d[id]" was ask a series of

4

The officer in Hansen gave the defendant a verbal warning for lack of insurance.
2002 UT 125, ,r,p 1-12. However, the record did not show that the officer gave a citation
or warning for the initial lane change infraction. See id. But even though the lane change
infraction may have warranted a citation, this fact did not matter to the Hansen court.
Indeed, unlike the trial court in this case, the Hansen court did not focus on whether the
unrelated questioning exceeded the time "it would have taken" to issue such a citation
"had the officer proceeded to do so." Compare R.118, with Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ,r,r1112, 27-32.
15
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unrelated questions and conduct a Terry frisk. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. These tasks
"add[ed] time to[] 'the stop"' and exceeded the traffic stop's scope. Id. 5
Finally, no circumstances justified extending the traffic stop beyond its initial
scope. The trial court was correct to conclude that Officer Lampshire's additional

(a;;.;

questioning and Terry frisk was not justified by reasonable suspicion. See R.117, 245
(concluding that up until the point of McLeod's ultimate statement that he had a syringe,
"there was no basis presented to justify either reasonable suspicion or probable cause for
investigation of any activity beyond the observed traffic violation."). Although
Lampshire testified that he was concerned McLeod possessed weapons because he was
"moving all around," Utah courts have held that furtive movements alone do not support
a reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous. See State v. Parke, 2009 UT
App 50, ,r,r9-11, 18; see also State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 1989); State
v. Martinez, 2008 UT App 90, ,r2 n.3, 182 P.3d 385; State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 511-

12 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court also correctly concluded that "for the duration of
the time that Defendant interacted with Officer Lampshire up until the time he was placed
under arrest, the encounter was a level two encounter." R.117; Addendum D. 6 Indeed,
~

5

Although the trial court's ultimate conclusion was incorrect, the court did
properly find that Lampshire's investigative activities added time to the stop that
otherwise could have been devoted to lawful, traffic-related tasks. Specifically, the court
noted that it was "troubled by the fact that Officer Lampshire did spend some time which
should have been devoted to conducting the traffic investigation to looking at other
things; namely, asking whether Defendant had illegal substances on him, conducting a
Terry frisk, and diverting his attention away from the traffic investigation." R.118;
AddendumD.
6

The State did not argue that the traffic stop deescalated to a consensual
encounter. See R.11 7.
16
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4s

McLeod would not have felt "free to leave or disregard [Lampshire's] questioning"
where he was subject to "the threatening presence of more than one officer," where the
officer's emergency lights remained activated for the duration of the encounter, and
where Lampshire never told McLeod that he was free to leave or that he did not have to
answer the additional questions. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ,I,I39-46; R.169-70, 178-79, 190.
In sum, Officer Lampshire unlawfully extended the scope and duration of the
traffic stop to question and frisk McLeod without reasonable suspicion of new criminal
activity. Thus, the continued detention of McLeod violated the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable seizures.

B. The evidence seized f ollowillg the illegal detention requires suppression under
the exclusionary rule.
Generally, under the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained ... in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded from criminal proceedings." State v. Harker, 2010 UT
56, ill 7, 240 P.3d 780; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (recognizing
that "in order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of the home
and inviolability of the person ... evidence seized during an unlawful search could not
constitute proof against the victim of the search"); see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT
47, iJ42, 164 P.3d 397 ("When applicable, the exclusionary rule keeps out of trial
evidence primary and derivative obtained through a violation of an individual's
constitutional rights (the 'fruit' of unconstitutional police conduct).").
If evidence is obtained pursuant to a consent search, admission of the evidence is
permissible only when consent is valid. See Hansen at iJ47. However, if consent is

17
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"obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality," it is not valid, and the evidence
seized pursuant to that consent search must be excluded. Id. This is because "[ e]vidence
obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is tainted by the violation of a person's
constitutional rights." Id. at iJ62.
"[T]he purpose behind excluding evidence obtained by police exploitation is to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, when conducting an exploitation analysis, this Court considers this
deterrent purpose as it examines the facts of each case. Id. at iJiJ62-64. This Court also
considers the following three factors: (1) "the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal
conduct,[ (2)] the presence of intervening circumstances, and [(3)] the temporal
proximity between the illegal detention and consent." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In this case, Officer Lampshire exploited the unlawful seizure of McLeod in order
to obtain his consent. First, the "purpose and flagrancy" factor weighs in favor of
suppression. Lampshire recognized that when he approached McLeod after running a
~

computer check, he was limited to issuing a citation or a warning, but nevertheless
unlawfully detained McLeod for further investigation. R.185-186. At the evidentiary
hearing, defense counsel asked: "So ... at that point, it was either write the citation or
give him a warning or do something ... ; correct?" Id. Lampshire first responded "well,
not with that area," but ultimately stated that in terms of "the traffic stop, yes." Id.

18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lampshire's "not with that area" comment suggests that he was conducting a
fishing expedition due to the character of the neighborhood and not based on any
reasonable, particularized suspicion that McLeod was engaged in drug or weaponsrelated activity. Additionally, the comment suggests that the purpose of the illegal
detention was to exploit the opportunity to obtain consent-which Lampshire sought
almost immediately-in order to facilitate his drug and weapon-related investigation.
Under these circumstances, there was a "direct connection" between the purpose of
Lampshire's misconduct and McLeod's consent. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, iJiJ66-67.Thus,
"suppressing the evidence derived from this misconduct should have a deterrent effect."

Id. at iJ67.
Secondly, the illegality was not mitigated by any intervening circumstances, such
as Lampshire informing McLeod that he had a right to refuse consent. See id. at ,I68.
Rather, as discussed, there was a direct causal connection between the illegal detention
and McLeod's consent. McLeod's ultimate response that he possessed "a syringe" was
not an intervening circumstance. Not only was this statement made after McLeod had
already given consent, but it was directly connected to Lampshire's misconduct as well.
See R.116, 171, 184-85, 187-88. Indeed, McLeod initially denied possessing anything

illegal. R.116, 184, 187. But as the illegal detention continued to persist, he ultimately
Vi

said that he had "a syringe" after the officer completed the unlawful Terry frisk. See
R.116, 171, 184-85, 187-88. This indicates that McLeod's syringe comment was not
based on his own free will, but was induced by Lampshire's unlawful actions. Thus, on
this record, there is nothing that shows a "clean break in the chain of events between the
19
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misconduct and [McLeod's] ... consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, iJ68. Accordingly,
Lampshire's illegal conduct was not mitigated by any intervening circumstances.
Finally, the brief time lapse between the illegal detention and McLeod's consent
also weights in favor of suppression. Id. at iJ69 ("A brief time lapse between a Fourth

~

Amendment violation and consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the
misconduct have not had time to dissipate."). Much like the progression of events in

Hansen, the illegal detention in this case began when Officer Lampshire asked McLeod if
he had anything illegal on him. See id. Immediately after McLeod said "no," Lampshire
sought and received consent to search the vehicle. R.184, 187. Thus, as in Hansen, "no
appreciable time passed between the illegal detention and the consent that would have
allowed the taint of the misconduct to dissipate." Id.
In sum, the purpose and flagrancy of Lampshire' s conduct, the absence of
intervening factors, and the brief time lapse between the illegality and consent all
demonstrate that McLeod's consent resulted from Lampshire's exploitation of the
unlawful detention. Accordingly, suppression is required because McLeod was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and his "consent to the search was obtained by police
exploitation of a prior illegality." Id. at iJ74. The trial court therefore incorrectly denied
McLeod's motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. McLeod respectfully requests that his judgment of
conviction be reversed.
SUBMITTED this J(/hday of June, 2016.

~gRA~~izuJM

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~

~

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 141902943 FS
Judge:
JAMES BLANCH
Date:
November 20, 2015

TY WILLIAM MCLEOD,
Defendant.

PRESENT
Clerk:
cyndiab
Prosecutor: NEVE, ROBERT A
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BOWN, CHRISTOPHER G
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 29, 1986
Sheriff Office#: 374150
Audio
Tape Number:
CR W33
Tape Count: 8:40-53
CHARGES
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended)

Plea: Guilty

- Class A Misdemeanor

- Disposition: 11/20/2015 Guilty

2. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor

~

Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/20/2015 Dismissed w/ Prejudi
Defendant waives the reading of the Information.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an enhancement to the
penalties for a subsequent offense.
HEARING

The defendant pleads guilty to an amended count 1, and count 2 is dismissed.
Information amended by interlination. **This is a Sery plea.**
Terms of the plea agreement are stated on the record.
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Case No: 141902943 Date:

Nov 20, 2015

ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
TY MCLEUD
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time
suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Concurrent with case 141908935, but consecutive to any other commitments.
SENTENCE FINE
Fine: $350.00
Charge# 1
Suspended: $0.00
Surcharge: $183.16
Due: $350.00
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$350.00
$0
$183.16
$350.00
Plus Interest
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
Credit towards the fine for treatment costs, including payments already made to Fresh
Start. Proof must be submitted to the Court.
COMMUNITY SERVICE

Complete 40 hour(s) of community service.
Community service to be completed through Salt Lake Co Probation Service.
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY
The following cases are on timepay 141902943.
The defendant is to pay $50.00 monthly on the 1st.
The number of payments scheduled is 6 plus a final payment of $53.51.
The first payment is due on 02/01/2016 the final payment of $53.51 is due on
08/01/2016. The final payment may vary based on interest.
ORDER OF PROBATION
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Case No: 141902943 Date:

Nov 20, 2015

The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s}.
Probation is to be supervised by Salt Lake Co Probation Service.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 350.00 which includes the surcharge. Interest may
increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court. This can be paid online at: www.utcourts.gov/epayments.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Salt Lake County Probation.
Violate no laws.
Comply with all standard drug and alcohol conditions imposed by probation agency.
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor associate with any
persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol or illegal drugs.
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise distributed
illegally.
Submit to drug testing.
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the request of any law
enforcement officer.
No spice, ivory wave or items of the nature.
Submit to random UA's and/or ETG testing.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Not to possess alcohol nor frequent places where alcohol is the chief item of sale.
Continue and successfully complete current treatment at Fresh Start Outpatient
treatment.
If deemed appropriate by SLCPS, complete a substance abuse evaluation and successfully
complete any recommended treatment.
Report to SLCPS by 4:45 p.m. on 11/23/15 to initiate probation.
End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 141902943 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

SL CO PROB SVCS cjs-slcpsecr@slco.org
11/23/2015

/s/ CYNDIA BISHOP·

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV-Search and Seizure
Amendment IV. Search and Seizure

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

~
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U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE
PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION;
DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the
United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by
a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States,
or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.
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Christopher G. Bown (#9218)
Adam L. Crayk (#9443)
Douglas L. Stowell (#6659)
STOWELL & CRAYK, PLLC
2225 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 801-944-3459
Fax: 801-483-0705
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
VS.

TY WILLIAM MCLEOD,
Defendant.

Case No. 141902943

Judge Blanch

Defendant, TY WILLIAM MCLEOD, by and through counsel, hereby moves this Court
to suppress any and all evidence seized in violation of the 4 th Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the Utah Constitution pursuant to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 22.
Specifically, the defendant was stopped by Salt Lake City Police Officer Lampshire on March 7,
2014 for pulling into traffic without signaling. However, during the traffic stop SLCPD Officer
Lampshire and SLCPD Officer Steenblink impermissible extended the stop without cause by
performing an unsupported Terry Frisk. In addition, these officers impermissible went beyond
the scope of the traffic stop to investigate unsupported allegations. An evidentiary hearing is
scheduled on May 7, 2015 at 8:30am to address these issues.
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DATED this 17th day of April, 2015

/s/ Christopher G. Bown
CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN
STOWELL & CRAYK, PLLC
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies on this 17th day of April, 2015, that a copy of the
foregoing Motion to Suppress was served electronically via the Court's electronic filing system
to the following:

Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
111 East Broadway, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

/s/ Calli Stowell
STOWELL & CRAYK, PLLC
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Christopher G. Bown (#9218)
Adam L. Crayk (#9443)
Douglas L. Stowell (#6659)
STOWELL, CRAYK & BOWN, PLLC
2225 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 801-944-3459
Fax: 801-483-0705
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.

TY WILLIAM MCLEOD,
Defendant.

Case No. 141902943

Judge Blanch

Defendant, TY WILLIAM MCLEOD, by and through counsel, hereby moves this Court
to suppress any and all evidence seized in violation of the 4th Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the Utah Constitution pursuant to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 22.
Specifically, the defendant was stopped by Salt Lake City Police Officer Lampshire on March 7,
2014 for pulling into traffic without signaling. However, during the traffic stop SLCPD Officer
Lampshire and SLCPD Officer Steenblink impermissible extended the stop without cause by
performing an unsupported Terry Frisk. The only permissible objective of a Terry frisk is to
discover weapons that may be used against the officer or others. State v. Peterson, 110 P.3d 699,
702 (Utah 2005). The Utah Supreme Court held "Courts must apply a two-pronged analysis to
evaluate whether a Terry frisk is permissible, in that a court must first determine whether the
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officer's action was justified at its inception, and second, the court must assess whether the action
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." Id. As such, because no reasonable articulable suspicion existed to search for weapons,
the subsequent actions by the officer impermissible exceeded the scope of the stop and should be
suppressed.
In the event, that the search for weapons by the officers was permissible, their subsequent
detention without concluding the traffic violation that occurred was an unreasonable extention of
the scope of the stop. The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
[D]uring a traffic stop an officer "may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct
a computer check, and issue a citation." ... Once the purpose of the initial stop is concluded,
however, the person must be allowed to depart. "' Any further temporary detention for
investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop" constitutes an
illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further
illegality.
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, ,I31 (Utah 2002). Because the officer did not conclude the
initial stop without further probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the continued detention of the
Defendant was impermissible and further evidence obtained should suppressed. An evidentiary
hearing is scheduled on August 27, 2015 at 9:00am to address these issues.
DATED this 26th day of August, 2015

Isl Christopher G. Bown
CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN
STOWELL, CRAYK & BOWN, PLLC
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies on this 26th day of August, 2015, that a copy of the
foregoing Amended Motion to Suppress was served electronically via the Court's electronic
filing system to the following:

Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
111 East Broadway, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Isl Calli Stowell
STOWELL, CRAYK & BOWN, PLLC
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Christopher G. Bown (#9218)
Adam L. Crayk (#9443)
Douglas L. Stowell (#6659)
STOWELL, CRAYK & BOWN, PLLC
2225 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 801-944-3459
Fax: 801-483-0705
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

<iv

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
VS.

TY WILLIAM MCLEOD,

Case No. 141902943

Defendant.
Judge Blanch

Defendant, TY WILLIAM MCLEOD, by and through counsel, hereby moves this Court
to suppress any and all evidence seized in violation of the 4 th Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the Utah Constitution pursuant to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 22.

FACTS
On March 7, 2014, Salt Lake City Police Officer Lampshire was doing drug enforcement in the
area when an individual, later identified as Ty McLeod, was seen parking his vehicle and
walking over to the park and talked with several individuals. These individuals pointed towards
the location where Officer Lampshire was in his vehicle. Officer Lampshire then watched Ty
McLeod get back into his car and leave. As he left, Officer Lampshire observed the defendant
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fail to signal while pulling into traffic. Officer Lampshire followed Ty McLeod and pulled him
over for the observed traffic violation. When Office Lampshire approached the vehicle, he asked
Ty McLeod for his driver's license, registration and insurance. Ty McLeod was unable to
provide the asked for information but provided his name and information for Officer Lampshire.
Officer Lampshire indicated that Ty McLeod could still look for his driver's license. Another
Officer Steenblink was present and standing to the side of the vehicle and did not express any
concerns to him during the stop. Officer Lampshire ran Ty McLeod's information, found he had
a valid driver's license, valid registration and had no outstanding warrants. After completing this
he saw Ty McLeod making "furtive movements." Officer Lampshire asked Ty McLeod to leave
the vehicle and performed a Terry Frisk of Ty McLeod. No weapons were found. After not
finding any weapons, the officer asked Ty McLeod to search his vehicle. Officer Lampshire
never cited Ty McLeod for the traffic violation. Officer Lampshire did not perform an inventory
search of the vehicle because it was released to the owner of the vehicle.
ARGUMENT
~

I.

Ty McLeod was impermissibly detained beyond the scope of the traffic stop.
While there is no argument that the initial stop was permissible under existing case law,

the subsequent detention outside the scope of the traffic stop was impermissible and any
evidence seized should be suppressed. The courts look at two questions when analyzing whether
a traffic stop is reasonable, those are "(1) was the police officer's action justified at its inception?
And (2) was the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified
the interference in the first place?" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994)(quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). Under the first question, it is undisputed that the only

basis for the stop as articulated by Officer Lampshire was for a failure to signal when turning
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into traffic and that Office Lampshire initial stop was reasonable. It is the second question where

~

Officer Lampshire's stop goes beyond the scope of the detention. When Officer Lampshire
stopped Ty McLeod he was allowed to "request a driver's license and vehicle registration,
conduct a computer and issue a citation." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. In the case before the court,

~

Officer Lampshire did all these things minus issue a citation. The Utah Supreme Court stated
that "[ o]nee the purpose of the initial stop is concluded, however, the person must to depart.
~

"Any further temporary detention for investigative questioning after fulfilling the purpose for the
initial traffic stop" constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an office has probable cause or a
reasonable articulable suspicion of a further illegality. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 131. In
Hansen, the officer in that case extended the encounter by questioning Hansen about what he had
and whether he could search the vehicle. The Utah Supreme Court stated, that "[s]ince the scope
of the questioning exceeded, without justification, the purpose of the initial traffic stop, the
continued encounter was illegal unless some other circumstance justified the additional
questioning." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 132. Much like the situation in Hansen, Officer
Lampshire's continued detention after the purpose of the stop was over requires suppression
unless there is another basis to extend the stop. Because there is no reasonable basis to extend
the stop as will be discussed further, Officer Lampshire's request to search the vehicle
constituted an illegal detention and the evidence should be suppressed.
II.

There was no basis to extend the stop based for a search for weapons.
Officer Lampshire went impermissibly beyond the scope of the traffic stop above based

on a Terry Frisk. The only basis for Officer Lampshire's Terry frisk was the "furtive
movements" of Ty McLeod. Although, he had given permission to Ty McLeod to continue
looking for his driver's license which would serve as a reasonable explanation for the furtive
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movements, there was no other stated basis for the subsequent detention for a Terry Frisk. In

State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court confronted this same
situation and officer's use of "furtive movements" to justify reasonable articulable suspicion.
~

The Court stated, "mere furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an
articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity. State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1137. The
Court went on to say:
[the defendant's] movements, turning to the left and to the right, appearing fidgety,
bending forward, and turning to look at the officer, do not, without more, show a
reasonable possibility that criminal conduct had occurred or was about to occur.
Schlosser may have been attempting to locate a driver's license. He could have been
preparing for conversation with the officer by turning down the volume on the radio
or extinguishing a cigarette. He may also have been putting away food and beverages,
changing a baby's diaper, putting on the parking brake or doing a host of other
innocuous things. When confronted with a traffic stop, it is not uncommon for drivers
and passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to turn to look at an approaching
police officer. A search based on such common gestures and movements is a mere
"hunch," not an articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment.

Id. At 1138. Based on this language, Officer Lampshire's basis of furtive movements is not a
sufficient basis to search for weapons because it amounts to nothing more than a hunch. There
are no other facts that make Officer Lampshire's hunch rise to a level of reasonable articulable
suspicion that Ty McLeod had a dangerous weapon. As such, the continued detention of Ty
McLeod was impermissible and Officer Lampshire's request to search the vehicle was outside
the scope of the traffic stop. Officer Lampshire should've finished the purpose of the traffic stop
and issued a citation to Ty McLeod and let him go. Because this didn't occur, the evidence
should be suppressed.

III.

There is no other basis for the continued detention of Ty McLeod.

The court indicated that at the end of the evidentiary hearing that it was interested in the
holding inDevenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) that states, "the controlling Fourth
Amendment question is not whether an officer has the correct law in mind at the time he acts, but
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whether the available facts objectively show that there was some ground to believe the law was
violated." State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, «ffl3. While the holding and case law expressed by
both these cases is not in dispute, its holding is limited in this case. The other crimes of
jaywalking and no proof of insurance could be construed as a basis for continued detention,
however, no further investigation beyond the scope of the traffic stop was necessary and as such,
it doesn't provide a basis for continued detention of Ty McLeod.
CONCLUSION
Because Officer Lampshire did not conclude the initial stop without further probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, the continued detention of the Defendant was impermissible and
the evidence obtained should be suppressed.
DATED this 12th day of September, 2015

Isl Christopher G. Bown
CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN
STOWELL, CRAYK & BOWN, PLLC
Attorney for Defendant

6b
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies on this 12th day of September, 2015, that a copy of the
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress was served electronically via the
Court's electronic filing system to the following:

Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
111 East Broadway, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Isl Calli Stowell
STOWELL, CRAYK & BOWN, PLLC
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Silvl GILL, Bar No. 6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ROBERT A. NEVE, Bar No. 14270
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (385) 468-7600

~

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,

~

vs.
Case No. 141902943FS
TY WILLIAM MCLEOD,
Judge JAMES BLANCH
Defendant.

The State of Utah, through its counsel, Silvl GILL, Salt Lake County District Attorney, and
BOB NEVE, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and respectfully requests that this Court deny
Defendant's Motion for the reasons set forth below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 7, 2014, Officer Lampshire of the Salt Lake Police Department was on Bike
Squad watching the area of200 S 500 W, a high crime area known for drug trafficking and multiple
aggravated crimes. While on duty Officer Lampshire observed a vehicle park in the median at

~

around 260 S and 500 W. The officer observed a male, later identified as Ty McLeod, Defendant,
wearing a red sweat shirt and blue sweat pants, exit the vehicle and walk down the middle of the
northbound traffic side towards 225 S 500 W where the portable restrooms are located. Defendant

1
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Gt.,

stopped three different people to talk to them, the last of whom, a black male, pointed towards
Officer Lampshire. It appeared to Officer Lampshire that the black male was letting Defendant
know that police were in the area. Defendant continued walking and then began heading east on
200 S towards Rio Grande St.
Officer Lampshire pulled onto 500 S and 200 S where he could observe Defendant talking
to two different Hispanic males. Offer Lampshire then observed Defendant get back into his
vehicle and pull away from the curb, merging into traffic without signaling. Based on this traffic
infraction, Officer Lampshire pulled Defendant over. The officer approached Defendant and asked
him for his driver's license, proof of insurance, and registration. Defendant was unable to locate
any of these documents. Officer Lampshire was able to locate Defendant's driver's license on his
computer. Meanwhile, Officer Steenblik arrived and was watching Defendant in the driver's seat.
Officer Steenblik observed Defendant hastily moving items around.
The officers approached Defendant again and asked him if there was anything illegal in his
car and he stated "no." Officer Lampshire asked Defendant ifhe could search the vehicle and
Defendant stated "sure." Defendant then reached over to the passenger seat where there were a few
shirts and put his hand over the shirts grabbing at something. Officer Lampshire opened his door
and had him exit the vehicle, explaining it was for officer safety. Officer Lampshire asked
Defendant if he had any weapons on him, and Defendant stated he did not. Officer Lampshire
conducted a Terry frisk of Defendant and asked Defendant once more whether there was anything
illegal inside the vehicle. This time, Defendant said there was, and told the officer there was a

V,
syringe in his shoe in the back seat. Officer Lampshire located the shoe and discovered some liquid
heroin still left inside the syringe. Next to that, the officer also discovered an open twist of heroin.
Officer Lampshire also discovered two other twists of heroin in the center console.

2
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Officer Lampshire placed defendant under arrest for possession of heroin.

ARGUMENT
Defendant seeks to suppress the evidence of possession of a controlled substance and drug
paraphernalia, which was obtained following Officer Lampshire's traffic stop of the Defendant due
to Defendant's merging into traffic without signaling, a violation of the Utah traffic code.
Defendant disputes the grounds for the stop, asserting Officer Lampshire exceeded the scope of the
stop when he asked Defendant a question unrelated to the initial detention. This Court should deny
Defendant's motion because Officer Lampshire did not impermissibly exceed the scope of the stop
by posing an unrelated question to Defendant. Accordingly, the evidence discovered following
Officer Lampshire's search of Defendant's vehicle, pursuant to Defendant's consent to search, was
lawfully obtained and should be admitted at trial.

I.

OFFICER LAMPSHIRE'S BRIEF QUESTIONS DID NOT IMPERMISSIBLY
EXTEND THE SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although a traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, a reasonable traffic stop is constitutional. State v. Hansen, 2012 UT 125, ,r 28. To

~

determine whether a traffic stop was reasonable, this com1 considers two questions: "(I) Was the
police officer's action justified at its inception? and (2) Was the resulting detention reasonably
4v

related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?" Id. at ,r 29
(citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994) (internal quotations omitted).
As to the first question, a traffic stop is justified at its inception when "the stop is incident
to a traffic violation committed in an officer's presence.' " Hansen at ,r 30 (internal quotations and
citations omitted); see also United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, 512 (10th
Cir.2000) (noting a traffic stop is justified if "the stop is based on an observed traffic violation.'').

3
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Regarding the second question, an officer may, during a traffic stop, "'request a driver's license
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation." Hansen at iI 31
(citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Once the purpose of
the initial stop is concluded, any further temporary detention for investigative questioning
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has reasonable suspicion of, or probable cause to
suspect further illegality. Id.
Defendant concedes that the stop in this case was justified at its inception due to the
Defendant's merging into traffic without signaling, a violation of the Utah traffic code. At issue in
this case, then, is the second question of the above two-step inquiry- whether the resulting
detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the
first place.
For the duration of a lawful traffic stop, "'[t]he temporary seizure of driver and passengers
ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop."' State v. Baker, 2010 UT
18, iI 13 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 (2009)). Unless the officer forms new
reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause of further criminal activity during the course of
the traffic stop, "the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has
concluded." Id.; see also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, iI 31 ("Any further temporary detention for
~

investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop constitutes an illegal
seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality."
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). If, during the course of the traffic stop,
police officers develop probable cause to arrest the driver, the passengers may lawfully be detained
until the arrest is complete. See Baker, 2010 UT 18, iiiI 16, 19. "At that time, officers must release

~

any passengers who were detained incident to the detention of the vehicle." Id. ,I 19.

4
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During the course of an otheiwise lawful encounter, however, "officers may pose
questions to drivers and passengers unrelated to the scope of the stop without reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity, so long as those actions do not measurably extend the length of the stop." State

v. Simons, 201 I UT App 251, 110; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009) ("An
officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably
extend the duration of the stop."). In making the determination of whether the stop has been
measurably extended, "[a] court should not micromanage the details of a traffic stop to ensure that
no actions of the police improperly extend the stop so long as the duration of the stop is reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances." Baker, 2010 UT 18, 1 17. Instead, "[ t]he reasonableness of
a detention should be evaluated on the basis of the totality of the circumstances facing the officer,
not onjudicial second-guessing." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,128.
In Simons, an officer pulled over a driver after the officer observed the driver traveling ten

miles over the speed limit. Upon approaching the driver, the officer observed signs of possible
impairment, and also saw in plain view a number of residue-filled baggies that appeared to the
officer to contain a controlled substance. The officer detained the driver to investigate his
reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated and was in possession of illegal drugs. The
officer then ceased his investigation into the driver and approached the defendant, who was a
passenger in the same vehicle. The officer asked the passenger whether he had anything on his
person that the officer needed to know about. Defendant confessed to having a pipe in his
undeiwear and methamphetamine in his pocket.
On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence of the pipe and methamphetamine should
have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The

5
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Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's admission of the evidence, concluding that the officer
did not exceed the permissible length of the stop by approaching Defendant and asking him a single
question - that is, whether he had anything on his person that the officer should know about. The
court explained that that question "did not measurably extend the length of the traffic stop or render
the overall duration of the stop unreasonable." Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of
defend ant's motion to suppress.
Similarly, in the present case, Officer Lampshire did not exceed the permissible length of
the traffic stop by posing two questions to the Defendant: whether there was anything illegal in
Defendant's car, and whether the officer could search the vehicle. See Simons, 2011 UT App 251, ,r
10 ("'During the course of an otherwise lawful encounter ... officers may pose questions to drivers
and passengers unrelated to the scope of the stop without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
so long as those actions do not measurably extend the length of the stop."). Accordingly, the
evidence discovered pursuant to Defendant's consent to search his vehicle was lawfully obtained,
and the evidence should therefore be admitted at trial.

CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence.
~

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25 th day of September, 2015.

STh,1GILL
District Attorney for Salt Lake County

Isl Bob Neve
Bob Neve
Deputy District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

~

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress was delivered to CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN,
ADAM L. CRAYK, and DOUGLAS L. SOTWELL, Attorneys for the Defendant, TY WILLIAM
MCLEOD, via email and Efile.

DATED this 25th day of September, 2015.

Isl Bob Neve

~
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SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ROBERT NEVE, Bar No. 14270
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (385) 468-7684

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OFLAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
TY WILLIAM MCLEOD,
Defendant.

CaseNo.141902943

Judge JAMES BLANCH

This matter came before the court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and the
State's Motion in Opposition. Oral arguments on these motions were held on September 30,
2015. Deputy District Attorney Robert Neve was present, representing the State, as well as
Christopher Bown, attorney for the Defendant. The court, having reviewed the memoranda in
support of the motions and related information furnished at the hearing, having heard the testimony
of Officer Lampshire, and having reviewed the audio recording of the preliminary hearings and the
relevant case law cited in the memoranda, made detailed oral findings and fact and conclusions of
law from the bench, which are incorporated herein by reference. Further, the court makes the
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fo1lowing findings of fact and conclusions of Jaw, which wiH either supplement or reiterate those
findings and conclusion issued oraJly from the bench on September 30, 2015.

FINDINGS OF FACT
On March 7, 2014, at approximately 200 S 500 W in Salt Lake City, Utah, Officer Lampshire
observed Defendant pull away in his vehicle without signaling, which the parties agree constituted a
legitimate basis to initiate a traffic stop. Following the traffic stop, Officer Lampshire approached
~

Defendant in his vehicle and asked Defendant for his license, registration, and proof of insurance.
Defendant was unable to produce any of the requested items.

Officer Lampshire went back to his

vehicle, called in to inquire about the driver's license, and was able to confirm that Defendant's
driver's license and registration was valid. However, Officer Lampshire was unable to determine
proof of valid insurance, which is a legal requirement and for which a traffic citation would be
appropriate.
After checking Defendant's driver's license, Officer Lampshire returned to Defendant's vehicle,
leaned down, and asked Defendant if he had anything illegal on him. Defendant stated no. Officer
Lampshire then asked Defendant if he could search the vehicle, and Defendant said "yes." Officer
Lampshire asked Defendant to exit the vehicle and conducted a Terry frisk of Defendant. In the
course of conducting that Terry frisk, the officer again asked Defendant whether he would find
anything illegal in the vehicle, and this time Defendant answered in the affirmative, stating "a
syringe." The period of time that elapsed from the intiation of the Terry frisk and the moment
Defendant stated he had an illegal syringe was substantially less that the amount of time that would
have been required to complete the issuance of a citation to Defendant for not having insurance.
Officer Lampshire searched the vehicle and located the syringe that Defendant indicated would be
present. Officer Lampshire also located other drugs and drug paraphernalia, which is the subject of
Defendant's motion to suppress. Based on the unlawful materials present in Defendant's vehicle,
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Officer Lampshire placed Defendant under arrest for possession or use of a controlled substance.
An inventory search was not conducted of the vehicle as the vehicle belonged to someone else and
that person was permitted to come and retrieve it.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Legally, there are certain questions that the court is required to answer.
The court concludes that for the duration of time that Defendant interacted with Officer
Lampshire up until the time he was placed under arrest, the encounter was a level-two encounter as
described in Utah law. Defendant was not free to leave, and the State has not contended otherwise.
Defendant has not argued that it was improper for Officer Lampshire to stop him for failing to
signal. Up until the moment Defendant indicated he had a syringe in his shoe, there was no basis
presented to justify either reasonable suspicion or probable cause for investigation of any activity
beyond the observed traffic violation.
The State pointed to furtive movements made by the Defendant and some suspicious acts by
Defendant which the officer observed prior to the traffic stop, and argued that these facts created
reasonable suspicion of further illegal activity. The court does not believe that these facts rise to the
level of creating reasonable suspicion beyond the traffic violation, so the court will confine its
~

analysis to whether the activities of the officer extended the traffic stop beyond what is considered a
reasonable period of time to conduct the investigation.
The court has looked at the caseof State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, which provides helpful
guidance with respect to this question. That case stands for the proposition that if an officer
conducts a traffic stop, has finished the purpose of the traffic investigation, and then asks questions
very similar to the questions that Officer Lampshire asked of Defendant, extending the traffic stop
beyond the purpose of the traffic investigation constitutes a constitutional violation. Here, Officer
Lampshire testified that Defendant responded in the affirmative to the officer's question of whether
Defendant had anything illegal on him within ten minutes after the initial traffic stop. The officer
also testified that an average amount of time for a reasonable officer to conduct a traffic stop is
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approximately ten minutes. The interaction at issue today falls within that timeframe.
If Officer Lampshire had continued his investigation without conducting a Teny frisk and
~

without asking Defendant the question which led to Defendant's admission that had heroin in his
shoe, Officer Lampshire would have had to write a citation, which would have taken at least as
much time as the Terry frisk and the two questions of whether Defendant had anything illegal on
him. Accordingly, it is the court's finding that the Defendant's statement, "yes, a syringe," occurred
within the time that it would have taken Officer Lampshire to complete the traffic investigation.
There was not an illegal extension of the stop, unlike the situation presented in the Hansen case.
The court is troubled by the fact that Officer Lampshire did spend some time which should
have been devoted to conducting the traffic investigation to looking at other things; namely, asking
whether Defendant had illegal substances on him, conducting a Terry frisk, and diverting his
attention away from the traffic investigation. However, the court does not find that Officer
Lampshire extended the length of the stop beyond the length of time it would have taken him to

ii

write a citation had the officer proceeded to do so for Defendant's lack of insurance. Indeed,
Officer Lampshire's activities that were not directed toward the traffic investigation took
substantially less time than would have been required to complete the traffic investigation and issue
a citation.
The court finds that probable cause for further investigation existed based on Defendant's
affirmative answer that "yes, I have something illegal, a syringe." The question then becomes
whether or not, in the scope of conducting that investigation, it was appropriate to search the
vehicle. It was not an inventory search incident to arrest because the vehicle belonged to someone
else. So the court will next consider the question of whether or not Defendant's consent to search
the vehicle was voluntary.
Officer Lampshire's testimony indicates that he asked Defendant if he could search the car.
There is nothing about the officer's testimony that would suggest that intimated the right to search
the car or that he searched the car without Defendant's consent. Defendant's answer was
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unqualified and freely given that the officer could go ahead and conduct the search. The officer's
testimony indicates there was nothing involuntary or coerced about the search of the vehicle.

"'

Accordingly, the court finds that the search of Defendant's vehicle was conducted with appropriate
consent that was voluntarily given, and the contraband found in connection with that search is
admissible. For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant's motion to suppress is denied.

CONCLUSION
The court determines that Officer Lampshire did not unconstitutionally extend the scope of
the traffic stop and that Officer Lampshire's search of Defendant's vehicle was lawful, based on the
consent to search given by Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to suppress is denied.

~

****EXECUTED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT AS INDICATED BY THE DATE AND
SEAL AT THE TOP OF THE PAGE.****
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
V,

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 141908935 &
141902943

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

TRANSCRIPT OF:
Motion to Suppress
Evidentiary hearing

vs.
TYLER MCLEOD
Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES BLANCH

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-1860
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2

1
9:00 a.m.

August 27, 2015
2
3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4
5

THE COURT:

6

All right.

Good morning.

We're here today

7

in two cases filed State of Utah v. Tyler McLeod.

8

141908935 and 141902943.

9

please.

Counsel would make your appearances,

10

MR. BOWN:

Chris Bown for Mr. McLeod.

11

MR. NEVE:

Bob Neve for the State.

12

THE COURT:

13
14

Case is

All right.

Thank you.

And Mr. McLeod is

present.
We have scheduled today evidentiary hearings with

15

respect to these two motions, there's been a motion to suppress

16

filed by the State in each of these two cases.

17

from the previous discussions -- well, go ahead, Mr. Bown.

18

MR. BOWN:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BOWN:

21

motion to suppress.

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

I'm sorry.

My understanding

You just said the State --

Oh.
-- by the State, and it's actually our

That's correct.

Two motions to suppress

filed by the Defense.
And it was my understanding based on the early -earlier discussions we had about this that what the parties
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1

intended was that we'd have evidence today and that briefing

2

would take place after we received the evidence today with

3

respect to both motions.

4

MR. BOWN:

5

THE COURT:

Is that right?

That's correct, Your Honor.
All right.

Very well.

Is there anything

6

we need to address before we get started with the State's

7

evidence?

8
9

~

MR. BOWN:
your Honor.

(Inaudible.)

We kind of talked about this,

I think what we're going to do in terms of evidence

10

is just one witness today, so we'll just make it clear what case

11

we're working on.

12

keep it separate, and then move to the next case and do the

13

direct.
THE COURT:

14

We'll do a direct, a cross, a direct, and

Okay.

I think that makes sense.

So do the

15

parties have a preference in terms of which case we'd start

16

with?

17
18

MR. BOWN:

the oldest case, the lower case number at this point.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. NEVE:

21

THE COURT:

22

Okay.

So that would be the case ending --

-- 2943.
2943.

Ruling to the traffic stop on March

7, 2014.

23

MR. BOWN:

24

THE COURT:

25

I think maybe we're just going to go with

Yes.
All right.

So if the State would like to

~

go ahead.
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1
2

MR. NEVE:

The State would call

officer Jon Lampshire.

3
4

Thanks, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right, Officer.

Please come forward

and be sworn.
{Officer Jon Lampshire sworn)

5

THE COURT:

6

All right.

Please take a seat up here,

7

Officer, and answer loudly and clearly in response to the

8

questions.

9

JON LAMPSHIRE,

10

Called by the State, having been duly

11

sworn, is examined and testifies as follows:

12
13
14
15

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. NEVE:
Q

Hello, Officer.

Would you state and spell your -- your

full name for the record.

16

A

Officer Jon Lampshire, J-O-N L-A-M-P-S-H-I-R-E.

17

Q

Thank you, Officer.

18

THE COURT:

19

of a sudden?

20

a week now.

Did we

did the volume get turned up all

I mean, we've been having this feedback for about

21

MR. NEVE:

22

I didn't touch it.

Just that -- do I need to pull this thing?

23

THE CLERK:

(Inaudible.)

24

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

All right.

Well, let's -- hopefully

it will work out okay.
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1

BY MR. NEVE:

2

Q

3

employed?

4

A

Salt Lake City.

5

Q

And how long have you been an officer at Salt Lake?

6

A

Nine years.

7

Q

Nine years.

8
9

Okay.

Officer Lampshire.

How are you currently

And what sort of training experience did

you have in becoming an officer?
A

We went through the state academy post and throughout

10

my career, I've done multiple trainings for narcotics,

11

(inaudible) stops, everything, traffic stops.

12

13

Q

Okay.

Do you have any other prior law enforcement

experience before working for Salt Lake?

14

A

No,

15

Q

And approximately how many drug-related stops you think

16

I do not.

you've been involved in?

17

A

A thousand

18

Q

Okay.

19

A

-- ish.

20

Q

Are you familiar with the area around 2nd South and 5th

21

West?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Okay.

24
25

And why is that area important to you?

Or does

that have any significance to you?
A

I was assigned down there as a drug -- as a bike squad,
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Ct,

1

which is a high -- high -- high crime area.

2

of aggravated crimes.

A lot drugs; a lot

~

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

And

5

Q

And so your specific purpose in that area is to deter

6

crime and/or to deter drug crime?

7

A

Yeah.

8

Q

Okay.

9

10
11

Do you have any special training in or

experience in being able to recognize drug deals or dug buys or
things to that effect?
A

Yeah.

I've been through a couple of narcotics

12

trainings to observe the packaging, and my experience out on the

13

street.
Okay.

What were your duties back on March 7 of last

14

Q

15

year?

16

A

I was assigned to the bike squad.

17

Q

Okay.

Which area -- were you in this area we're

18

discussing over on 5th West and 220 South or somewhere in that

19

area?

20

A

The -- the shelter area.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

Yeah.

23

Q

And what

24
25

The shelter area?

what happened that day?

Or do you recall

what your observed?
A

On that day I observed a vehicle pulled aside in the
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1

middle medium; a gentleman get out in a red sweatshirt, blue

2

pants, and walk down the middle of the road, which is

3

jaywalking.

4

up to the about three different people, and then they started

5

pointing that the cops were right there.

It was nowhere near a crosswalk, and watched him go

<ii

6

Q

So were you in a marked

7

A

Because I was on marked vehicle.

8

Q

How far away from this individual were you at the time?

9

A

Maybe 7 yards.

10

Q

Okay.

And this individual you were saying that was

11

wearing this clothing, do you recognize him here in the

12

courtroom today?

13

A

Yes, I do.

14

Q

And can you describe what he's wearing for the record?

15

A

He's wearing a gray shirt and with a pink and black

16

17

stripe.
Q

18
19

MR. NEVE:

22
23

Your Honor, may the record reflect that the

officer has identified the defendant?
THE COURT:

20
21

Okay.

Yes, it will.

BY MR. NEVE:
Q

Okay.

So you said you observed the defendant go and

speak with three different individuals on the street?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And they all pointed towards you in your marked -- were
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1

you on a bike or just in your --

2

A

No.

3

Q

Okay.

4

I was in my vehicle.
Okay.

So they pointed to you.

Is it a marked

vehicle or was it --

5

A

Yeah.

It's a marked vehicle.

6

Q

Okay.

What happened after these individuals made the

7
8
9

defendant aware that you were there?
A

He had walked around the corner heading up towards Rio

Grande from 500 West.

10

Q

Okay.

11

A

I lost sight with him

12
13
14
15

And then what happened?
sight of him, and I just

stayed back and waited for him to come back to his vehicle.
Q

Okay.

So when he came back to this car, to his

vehicle, what happened at that point?
A

He jumped in the driver's seat and pulled away from the

16

center part without using a signal, so I went to go initiate a

17

traffic stop.

18
19

Q

A

21

Q

23

So your initial traffic stop was for his failure

to signal --

20

22

Okay.

Yes.
is what was going on?

All right.

Did you initiate

were you able to complete that traffic stop?
A

Yes, I was.

I followed him down to 600 West to get off

24

of 200 South, because of the traffic.

25

there.

And followed him over

Initiated my traffic -- my emergency equipment.
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1

pulled to the side of the road, and I approached the driver's

2

side.

3

4
5
6

Q

Okay.

When you approached the driver's side, what --

what questions did you ask the defendant?
A

I asked him for his driver's license, proof of

insurance, and registration.

7

Q

8

of those?

9

A

He was not able to provide any of them.

10

Q

So what did you do at that point?

11

A

I gathered his information.

And what was his response?

Was he able to provide any

I went back to my car and

12

ran his information, found a valid driver's license.

13

that time, my backup officer arrived and was watching him.

14
15

Q

Did you -- were you able to see the defendant from your

vehicle as well?

16

A

Yeah.

17

Q

What was he doing --

18

A

I could see the top of his head.

19

But during

I could see him.

He was moving all

around.

20

Q

And why did that matter to you?

21

Q

Because any type of a furtive movement, you know, comes

22

into my safety.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

And we had to do something about it.

25

Q

Were you concerned whether or not he might be moving
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1

evidence or weapons or anything to that effect?

~

2

A

My concern at that time was more weapons.

3

Q

Okay.

4
5

So what did you do after you observed the

defendant moving around and doing this -A

I exited my vehicle.

My backup officer came up to the

6

passenger side and told him to keep his hands where he could see

7

them.

8

the vehicle, asked him if he had any weapons on him.

9

"No."

10

Q

And did you find any weapons on him --

11

A

There was no weapons on him.

12

Q

Okay.

(Inaudible) came up the driver's side.

I had him exit
He said,

I did a Terry frisk on him real quick.

What -- before he got out of the vehicle, what

13

else -- did you observe him doing anything else with his hands

14

making any motion?

15

A

Yeah.

Well, when I came up, he was trying to put his

16

hands up underneath some clothing on the -- on the passenger

17

seat.

18

Q

Okay.

And was that -- was that concerning to you?

19

A

Yeah.

That was really concerning because I had my

20

other officer right over there, and I didn't know what he was

21

grabbing for.

22

Q

Okay.

And so when you had him exit the vehicle, at the

23

time that you Terry frisked him, or going to frisk for weapons,

24

was he in custody already at that point?

25

was he still capable -- was he still next to his car?

Was he in cuffs?
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1

was he is located?

2

A

He was detained, not in handcuffs.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

He was not under arrest.

5

Q

Was he still standing next to his car when you did the

6

frisk?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Okay.

9
10

At that other -- at that same time, did you

did you ever ask him if he had anything illegal with him or in
his vehicle?

11

A

Yes, I did.

12

Q

And was that before you had him get out of his car or

13
14

after?
A

It was after I had him get out of the car when I got

15

done Terry frisking him or while I was Terry frisking him.

16

asked if he had anything illegal in the car.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

He said he had a syringe in there.

19

Q

Okay.

I

And what was his response?

Without his -- the first time you asked him, did

20

he acknowledge that he had a syringe or was it a second time?

21

Or when did

22

A

It was just during the conversation.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

I can't remember what exact time it was.

25

Q

Okay.

~

So he indicated to you that he had a syringe.
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~

1

Did you ask him what type of syringe it was or what was it for

2

or?

3

vP

A

I just asked him if there was anything illegal in

4

there, and he said there was a syringe, so I just took that as

5

drug paraphernalia.

6

Q

Okay.

7

A

I did.

8

Q

And what was his response?

9

A

"Sure. "

10

Q

Okay.

11

A

Yes, he did.

12

Q

All right.

13
14

Did you ask him if you could search his vehicle?

So he gave you consent to search his vehicle?

At that point did you go ahead and search

the vehicle?
A

Yeah.

I had him sit on the -- the corner around the

15

curb behind his car, and Officer {inaudible) watched him, and I

16

conducted a search of the vehicle.

~

17
18
19
20
~

21
22

~

Q

Okay.

And did you observe -- did you -- what did you

find or did you
A

I found what he said, you know,

the syringe, and then a

black twist of heroin.
Q

Okay.

And how do you know that this was heroin?

From

your training experience or did --

23

A

24

packaged.

25

Q

Through my training experience, yes, and the way it was

Okay.

Let's see.

Did you observe anything else that
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1

was in plain view from you while you were looking into the

2

vehicle, that you recall?

3

A

Not right off top of my head.

4

Q

And did you recall where he told you where the syringe

6

A

It was back in his shoe.

7

Q

Okay.

5

8

was?

Did you write a report around this time last

year that would have been synonymous with this case?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And would looking at that report help to refresh your

11

recollection as to the location of any other items you

12

discovered in the vehicle?

13

A

14

MR. NEVE:

15

THE COURT:

16

17
18

~

Yes.
Your Honor, if I may approach.
You may.

BY MR. NEVE:
Q

Referring to the second page of your report,

(inaudible) paragraph.
THE COURT:

19

You can just read that silently to

20

yourself, and then indicate "yes" or "no" whether that refreshes

21

your recollection concerning that question.

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Yeah.

Yes.

All right.

Thank you.

BY MR. NEVE:
Q

All right.

So after refreshing your recollection, what
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1

if anything else did discover in the vehicle, did you see in the

2

vehicle?

3

A

In the syringe was liquid heroin.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

It tested positive.

6
ViP

V,

~

Q

8

reaching?

9

A

So in the center console nearby where the defendant was

Yes.

Right where -- right over the top where he was

10

reaching.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

Yeah.

13

Q

-- twists of heroin?

That's where you found two additional --

Okay.

Did the defendant at any

point ever provide you proof of insurance?

15

A

No.

16

Q

Okay.

Did you impound this vehicle, or did you make

17

the decision to impound this vehicle?

18

regards to that?

Or what happened in

19

A

No.

20

Q

And why didn't you impound the vehicle?

21

A

It was not his vehicle.

22

23
vtP

other twists.

7

14

And in the center console was two

wife's.
Q

24

vehicle?

25

of it?

We did not impound the vehicle.

It was his girlfriend's or

I can't remember which one it was.
Okay.

So what -- what did you do in regards to the

Did you wait for somebody to arrive to take possession
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1
2
3

A

come grab it.
Q

4

5

Okay.
MR. NEVE:

THE COURT:

MR. BOWN:

12

All right.

Thank you.

Cross examination,

Just some follow-up questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

9

11

No further questions at this

Mr. Bown.

8

10

All right.

time, your Honor.

6

7

I had Officer Steenblik stay back and wait for her to

BY MR. BOWN:
Q

So you pulled him over for failing to use a signal;

correct?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

You never addressed the jaywalking even though you

15

mentioned that he jaywalked; right?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Okay.

18

information:

19

card; correct?

And then when you -- you asked him for all his
His driver's license, registration, and insurance

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And he couldn't produce it?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

And you went back, you got your information from,

24
25

date of birth,
A

like,

just information to look him up right

Yes.
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1

Q

And then you -- do you recall

2

telling him, too, to keep looking for his registration or

3

anything while you did -- while you went back to the vehicle?

4

A

No.

5

Q

Would you be surprised if

do you tell people to keep

6

looking for it?

7

looking for their stuff, even though they haven't been able to

8

produce it to you at that point?

Or is it shocking to you that people keep

9

A

No, it was not shocking.

10

Q

Okay.

11

A

It does.

12

Q

Okay.

13

So it happens; right?

And that would involve moving around, trying to

look for stuff; correct?

14

Q

You have to answer out loud, sorry.

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

I know what you're saying.

17

Yes.

THE COURT:

Yeah.

important we have verbal responses.

19

BY MR. BOWN:

21

Q

Okay.

The record's got to say it.

It's only an audio record, so it's

18

20

~

in your system?

So while you're -- so you look it up, he has a

valid driver license; correct?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

You don't see -- when you're looking up, do you look

24

for his criminal history or anything like that to see if there's

25

anything else going on?
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1

A

I look for warrants.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

No.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

No.

7

Q

Okay.

9
10

You didn't see anything that was -- raised

concerns of violence at that point for you in his record?

6

8

You didn't find any warrants at that point?

In the meantime, while you're doing this, is it

sorry. I want to make sure I get his name right -- Steenblik
is still standing by the car watching him the whole time;
correct?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Are you aware of what Steenblik's doing?

13

hear him from where you're at?

14

A

Yeah.

15

Q

Okay.

16

Like, can you

So he's watching him.

Is there a point where

you see Steenblik tell him just to stop moving around and --

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Okay.

19

A

As far as I'm concerned, yeah.

20

Q

Okay.

And he complies with that; right?

He complies with that.

And then you go back.

21

Having looked up all that, did you write him a citation at that

22

point?

23

A

No,

24

Q

Did you

25

I did not.
there was nothing to return, so did you tell

him he's free to go at that point?
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1

A

At what point, sir?

2

Q

When you went back after looking up all the

3

information, the driver's license, you went back to the vehicle;

4

correct?

5

A

Uh-huh.

6

Q

Okay.

7

So when you went back to the vehicle after

looking up all that information, did you write him a ticket?

8

A

No,

9

Q

Did you discuss the ticket with him at that point?

10

A

No.

11

Q

Did you talk to him about the left-hand turn like you

12

I did not.

were going to warn him at that point?

13

A

I didn't say anything about warning.

14

Q

Okay.

15

16
17
18

But -- what I'm saying is, you didn't talk to

him about that left-hand or the signal problem
A

I explained to him why I pulled him over.

I do every

time I approach the window.
Q

Was that -- and maybe I'm not being clear -- that's

19

when you first go up, you explain to him why you pulled up;

20

correct?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

But when you went back -- then you go back to your

23

vehicle, do your records checks and everything like that --

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

-- and then you went back to him; right?
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Okay.

3

And at that point, you didn't say anything to

him about the left-hand turn; correct?

4

A

No,

5

Q

Or

6

A

We were worried about the furtive movements.

7

Q

Okay.

8

I did not.
okay.

And that was the -- the basis for why you went

~

into the Terry frisk at that point?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Okay.

In terms of -- but you never told him -- because

11

you didn't give him any document, you never told him he's free

12

to go at that point on the citation for the reason to pull over;

13

correct?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

So that means you didn't tell him that he was free to

16

go at that point?

17

A

I did not tell him, no.

18

Q

Okay.

19

MR. BOWN:

20

THE COURT:

21

Q

23

for this.

25

Sure.

Take your time.

BY MR. BOWN:

22

24

Your Honor, if I could just have a second.

Just one other question.

And you may need your report

I understand.
How much time elapsed from when you pulled him over to

running all those records checks and then going back and talking
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1

Best guess.

I know it's been a while.

2

A

Maybe 10 minutes.

3

Q

Ten minutes?

4

v:P

to him?

Okay.

How long does it usually take you

do you do traffic enforcement?

5

A

Sometimes, yes.

6

Q

Okay.

So when you're doing just the

7

traffic-enforcement-type situation, how long -- is 10 minutes

8

about how long it takes you to make that contact?

9

A

Yeah.

10

Q

Okay.

Yes.

11

MR. BOWN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. NEVE:

14

THE COURT:

15
16

17

I have nothing further, your Honor.
All right.

Thank you.

Any further direct?

May I have one brief moment, Your Honor?
Yeah.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. NEVE:

Q

18

Just really quickly, Officer.
So you indicated earlier in your testimony that you

19

believe that you had asked the defendant if he had anything

20

illegal in his car after you had pulled him out of the vehicle

21

or asked him to step out of the vehicle.

22

surprised if your narrative -- or if you had written something

23

different than that back in your police report when this took

24

place?

25

A

But would you be

No.
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1

Q

Okay.

So do you believe that your memory was more

2

fresh back when you wrote your report or today, when you're

3

testifying today?

4

A

Back when I wrote it.

5

Q

Okay.

Do you think that if you were able to read

6

through your narrative, would it help to refresh your

7

recollection as to the exact sequence of events as to when you

8

asked him questions and when he was taken out of the vehicle?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Okay.

11

MR. NEVE:

12

THE COURT:

13

(Inaudible.)

14

THE WITNESS:

15

16
17

Q

sequence of events?
Yeah.

19

Q

Okay.

20

MR. NEVE:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. NEVE:

25

Okay.

Does that help to refresh your memories as far as the

A

24

You may.

BY MR. NEVE:

18

23

Your Honor, if I may approach.

If I may approach, Your Honor.
Yes, you may.
Thank you, your Honor.

BY MR. NEVE:
Q

So when you got out of your vehicle after having looked

up the defendant's driver's license information and looking to
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vo

1

see if he had any active warrants, when you first approached the

2

defendant, what was the sequence of events that -- what took

3

place?

4

A

After I had already had gathered his information?

5

Q

Yeah.

6

his information, went back to his vehicle -- or your vehicle,

7

and looked him up through your

8

when you eventually got out of the car and approached the

9

defendant again, what was the sequence of events?

10

ask him?

11

of the car immediately?

12

you took him out of the car?

What happened?

your system.

At that point

What did you

Did you first -- did you take him out
Or did you ask him questions before

13

A

I asked him questions first.

14

Q

Okay.

15

And what were the questions you asked before you

had asked him to step out of the vehicle?

16

A

I asked him if there was anything illegal in the car.

17

Q

Okay.

18
19
20
21
22

~

So you indicated earlier that you went and got

And was that a question based off of his furtive

movements, or was it based off of anything else?
A

His furtive movements and the way he was moving around

the driver's seat.
Q

Okay.

So you asked him if he had anything illegal in

the car, initially.
Sure.

23

A

11

24

Q

Okay.

25

A

He said,

And what was his statement?

11

11

I have a syringe."
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1

Okay.

Q

And then -- and then at that point, did you ask
i:i

2

him to step out of the vehicle?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Okay.

And then when was it that he then reached over

5

into the passenger seat?

6

then reached over --

7

Was it -- was it at that point that he

It was right as I was getting ready to bring him out of

A

after I asked him the question if there was anything in

8

the

9

the car.

He said "Yes," and I pulled him out -- I was pulling

10

him out, and that's when he reached over, and that's when

11

Steenblik started yelling at him --

12

Q

To not reach over there?

13

A

Yeah.

14

Q

Okay.

~

Okay.

15

MR. NEVE:

16

THE COURT:

No further questions, your Honor.
All right.

Thank you.

Any further cross?

RECROSS EXAMINATION

17
18

BY MR.

BOWN:

19

Q

Do you have your report in front of you?

20

A

I have the second one.

21
22

WI

The other one didn't print off

for some reason.
Q

Okay.

You just testified you asked him if there was

23

once you went up to him the second time, you approached the

24

vehicle and asked him if there's anything illegal in his car,

25

and you stated that he said "Yes" at that point, a syringe.
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1

A

He said "a syringe," yes.

2

Q

Okay.
MR. BOWN:

3

4

I just would
THE COURT:

5

6

(Inaudible. )

8

A

Right here?

9

Q

Feel free to read more of it if you want, but that's

what I'm getting at.

11

A

Oh, okay.

12

Q

Yeah.

13

A

Yeah.

14

Q

I think what -- so what -- what really happened is:

Yeah.

So and this is just to clarify the record.

A

Yes.

17

Q

-- at that point.

Then you asked him to search his

vehicle?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

And you said he said "Sure."

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Was there any point where he backpedaled on that and

23

He

told you No, there was nothing illegal in the vehicle --

16

18

VJ

BY MR. BOWN:
Q

15

vi}

Sure.

7

10

~

Now, if I -- if I can approach your Honor.

told you, No, he didn't want you searching the vehicle?

24

A

Not that I can recall.

25

Q

Okay.

And then it's in later conversations where he
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1

said that -- after you Terry frisked him outside of the vehicle,

2

that's where he talked to you about -- you asked him again about

3

if there's anything

4

Is there anything?

5

there; right?

~

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Okay.

after you're going to search the vehicle,
And that's when he told you the syringe was

And -- and just to -- to be clear one more time,

8

was

when you -- you didn't find anything of note to take him

9

into custody or detain him further on the left-hand

whatever,

10

the signal -- the problem, the original -- the reason you pulled

11

him over

12

A

Merging into traffic without a signal.

13

Q

You were done with that; correct?

When you -- like,

14

that was -- you were not doing anything with that at that point?

15

You would either write a citation at that point or you were

16

done; right?

17
18
19

A

Well,

~

I was still conducting my investigation on the

traffic stop.
Q

Okay.

And -- and what did you need -- left to do to

20

finish the -- conduct the investigation on the traffic stop?

21

Because, and correct me if I'm wrong, you'd observed the

22

violation yourself; correct?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

You'd ran his driver's license just to make sure there

25

was no wants or warrants at that point; correct?
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

There was nothing in his history that -- that suggested

3

further detention or you should detain him further on those --

4

any other matters; correct?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

So it was at that point, it was either write the

7

citation or give him a warning or do something at that point;

8

correct?

9

A

Well, not with that area.

10

Q

Well, but in terms --

11

A

In the traffic stop, yes.

12

Q

Okay.
MR. BOWN:

13
14

I have nothing further,

THE COURT:

16

MR. BOWN:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. NEVE:

22

Yes, you may.
( Inaudible) my report.
Thank you.

Any further direct?

I just have one more question for

clarification for the record, your Honor.

20
21

If I

may approach.

15

19

your Honor.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. NEVE:
Q

So just so I'm clear that the sequence of events for

23

the record is -- is clearly established, so -- and indicate --

24

tell me if I -- if I'm wrong.

25

So you issued the traffic stop; you went and spoke with
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1

the defendant; he did not have driver's license, registration,

2

or insurance.

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

You went back to your vehicle to search him for wants

5

and warrants.

While you were at your vehicle, Officer Steenblik

6

arrived was your backing officer.

7

observed him making several movements or moving around quite a

8

bit in his front seat?

Both you and Steenblik

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

You came at out of your vehicle, came up to the

11

defendant to speak with him again, you asked the defendant if he

12

had anything illegal with him, and he said "No," initially.
(ti;

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Then you asked him at that point if it was okay to

15

search his vehicle, and he said "yes" or "sure."

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

And then at that point, he -- he reached over to the

18

passenger's side seat underneath something?

19

A

Yeah.

Underneath the pile of clothes.

20

Q

Okay.

And you asked him -- or Steenblik told him to

21

stop that, and you asked him at that point to step out of the

22

vehicle so you could perform a Terry frisk?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Okay.

25

And then at that point, after you're completing

your Terry frisk, did you ask him again if there was anything
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"

1
2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And at that point, he said that there was a syringe?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Okay.

6

vehicle, and you found the syringe in the shoe he indicated?
A

Yes.

8

Q

And then you also said that you found a -- a twist of

heroin next to -- or nearby that syringe?

10

A

It was in the center console.

11

Q

Okay.

12

Was there just the -- the twists that were in

the center console?

Or was there also a twist next to the

13

A

There was a twist inside the shoe, also.

14

Q

Okay.

15

So you found the syringe with heroin in it as

well as a twist of heroin in his shoe?

16

A

Mm-hmm.

17

Q

And then you also found two twists of heroin in the

18

yj

And then at that point, you searched the

7

9

vJ

illegal in the vehicle?

center console while (Inaudible) was moving around?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Okay.

21
22

MR. BOWN:

And, your Honor, could we just clarify just

for the record that was a "yes"?

23

THE COURT:

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE COURT:

Just because --

Yeah.
Yes.
That last answer was "yes."
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1

THE WITNESS:

2

MR. NEVE:

Yes.

Okay.

Thank you.

I just wanted to make

3

sure the point -- the sequence of events was clearly

4

established.
THE COURT:

5
6

9

Just -- I have one or two

questions.

EXAMINATION

7

8

All right.

BY THE COURT :
Q

How much time elapsed from the time that you initiated

10

the traffic stop until the time that Mr. McLeod indicated that

11

he had a syringe in response to your question of whether he had

12

anything illegal?

13

A

Probably within a 10-minute scope.

14

Q

Within 10 minutes?

15

Less than 10 minutes?

Okay.

did you place Mr. McLeod under arrest?

16

A

I detained him for the search of vehicle, yes.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

Yes.

20

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

23

Q

Okay.

25

And that was based on the materials that were

found in the car?

22

24

I mean, when everything was all said or done,

was he arrested?

19

21

And

THE COURT:

Anybody want to follow-up with questions

(,C:.,'

'1!,;I

based on the questions I asked?
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1

MR. BOWN:

2

a follow-up, but I just -THE COURT:

3

4
5

6
7

Well, go ahead.
FURTHER RECROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. BOWN:
Q

With your -- when you initiate a stop, you usually do

the red and blue lights; correct?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

I mean, that's how you stopped him in this case?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Was there a point that you recall that you ever turned

12

those off, or were they on up until the point you basically

13

arrested him?

14
15
16
17
18

vj

I actually have (Inaudible) not necessarily

A

They were on the whole time.
MR. BOWN:

Yeah.

That was the only thing I wanted the

ask about.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right.

So do you want so

just move on to the next case?

19

MR. NEVE:

Yes, your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

21

So, Officer, we're going to move on now and switch over

Okay.

22

to Case 141908935.

And I'll remind you you're still under oath.

23

We administered an oath earlier in the other case.

24

still under oath with respect to your testimony and (inaudible)

25

questioning in this case, Officer.
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1

MR. NEVE:

Thank you, your Honor.
~

2
3

4
5
6

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. NEVE:
Q

Officer, would you just state your -- your full name

again for the record so that -A

Officer Jon Lampshire, J-O-N -MR. BOWN:

7

And, your Honor,

I'm okay for purposes of

8

record, all his prior experience and everything can be part of

9

this case.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. NEVE:

12

THE COURT:

Okay.
We don't need to rehash that part.
Very well.

So what we'll state for the
~

13

record in this case is that Officer Lampshire previously

14

provided testimony in Case 141902943, in which he gave some

15

information about his training and experiences.

16

incorporate for purposes of his testimony in the case ending in

17

935, the testimony furnished in that other case, so we don't

18

need to go over things that are duplicated.
MR. NEVE:

19

22
23

40

Thank you, your Honor.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

20
21

We'll just

BY MR. NEVE:
Q

~

Officer Lampshire, what were your duties on July 28 of

last year?

24

A

I was still on the bike squad --

25

Q

Okay.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Vj

Case No. 141908935 &
141902943

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

TRANSCRIPT OF:
Motion to Suppress

TYLER MCLEOD
Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES BLANCH

~

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-1860

September 30, 2015
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1

September 30, 2015

2:00 p.m.

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

4
THE COURT:

5

Good afternoon, everyone.

Mr. McLeod, if

6

you want to come up and sit with Mr. Bown, you're welcome to do

7

that.

8
9

10

We have two cases on the calendar this afternoon.
State v. Ty William Mccleod, Case No. 141902943 and 141908935.
Counsel, would you make your appearances, please.
MR. BOWN:

11
12

He's also

present.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. NEVE:

15

THE COURT:

16

Chris Bown for Mr. McLeod.

Thank you.
Bob Neve for the State.
All right.

I see you have Stephanie Picher

with you, too.

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

I do, your Honor, yes.

All right.

Welcome.

All right.

We had an

19

evidentiary hearing concerning these two motions to suppress,

20

and I heard the testimony of Officer Lampshire, who was the

21

arresting officer with respect to both cases.

22

parties have filed memoranda.

23

motion were filed by the defendant, and then the State filed

24

reclaim memoranda or further memoranda in opposition of the

25

motion.

Subsequently, the

First memoranda in support of the

So I've reviewed those carefully.

I've also reviewed

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00230

2

1

some of the pertinent case law cited in the memoranda, and I had

2

the opportunity yesterday to pull up the audio, the hearing, and

3

listen again to the testimony of Officer Lampshire, so I think

4

I'm fairly well equipped to proceed today.

5

motions, Mr. Bound, .

And there are your

So how did the parties want to proceed?

6

7

argue these and address them separately?

8

proceed that in that fashion.
MR. BOWN:

9

THE COURT:

10

How do you want to do?

Do you want to

Or why don't we

I guess that's --

Why don't we -- why don't we do it that way

11

just so that we kind of keep the issues separately and not get

12

things confused. Why don't we talk first about the the case

13

involving that search of the vehicle, and it was the first one

14

that Officer Lampshire testified about, so that would be case

15

141902943 with the traffic stop.

vj

16

MR. BOWN:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BOWN:

~

Do you -- I guess beyond what I wrote, do

you have any questions about what I wrote at that point?
THE COURT:

21
22

And so if you'd like to present your

argument with respect to that.

19
20

Okay.

I don't any questions off the top of my

head.

23

MR. BOWN:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BOWN:

Okay.
So go ahead and proceed with your argument.
Your Honor, and I'll just kind of address it
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1

in light of the State's opposition.

2

that the initial traffic stop was invalid.

3

that's pretty -- that's clear, that the officer had a reason to

4

stop him for the traffic violation.

5

in coming down to this is:

6

traffic stop.

7

THE COURT:

Again, we're not arguing
That's -- I think

Where we differ,

I think,

Whether he extended the scope of the

You know, I think I agree with you.

It

8

seems to me that the issue here, the real issue, having read

9

Hansen, which seems to me to be the most helpful case regarding

10

this issue, that it's -- it strikes me, and you can maybe focus

11

the rest of your commentary around these observations, and

12

Mr. Neve, you can argue to the contrary if you disagree with

13

anything that I say, that this was Level II encounter.

14

not -- he was detained.

15

II encounter up until the time that he was arrested, at which

16

point it was a Level III encounter.

17

until the time that Mr. McLeod said he had a syringe, I have

18

probable cause to investigation anything other than the traffic

19

violation.

20

question of whether or not at the time that Mr. McLeod said "I

21

have a syringe," which created probable cause to investigate

22

that issue further beyond the traffic violation, whether at that

23

point the duration of the investigation of the traffic violation

24

had been extended unreasonably.

25

He was not free to go.

He was

It was a Level

And he did not, at least up

And so in my mind, it really comes down to the

MR. BOWN:

And, obviously, my argument is that it had.
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~

1

And the reason why is, if you read in Hansen, there's a -- and

2

there's just a paragraph that sits right along with what is

3

going on.

4

to do.

5

through the process, get his identification, that type of stuff,

6

check for warrants is

7

write the citation.

So you have to -- I mean, it's just basically, go

is allowed, then you're supposed to

That didn't happen in this, and that's where the

8
9

There's a purpose to a traffic stop and what you have

Officer Lampshire failed to do what he was supposed to, which

10

is, he had gone through that whole process, we were up here with

11

him, and he conceded that he was done with all that, that he was

12

ready to write the citation.

13

talked about those furtive movements.

I addressed it.

14

did nod about the Terry frisk aspect.

I don't think that's

15

detrimental to their case in terms of, because nothing was found

16

in the process of it.

17

THE COURT:

And then he went up and he said --

Well, yeah.

I

mean,

I

Mr. Neve

think that the Terry

18

frisk issue is a red herring unless the time that it took to do

19

the Terry frisk unreasonably extended the duration of the stop,

20

so --

21

MR. BOWN:

22

THE COURT:

Right.
-- it's not -- there's no issue -- question

23

really about whether the Terry frisk was justified because

24

nothing was found when the Terry frisk --

25

MR. BOWN:

Right.
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1

THE COURT:

-- was conducted.

But did the time that it

2

took to conduct the Terry frisk unreasonably extend the duration

3

of the stop.

4

MR. BOWN:

Right.

And what's -- that's where I think

5

the Courts have always been very careful about to trying to put

6

a time limit on it.

7

because I remember -- I can't cite the case.

8

this too long.

There's no magic number.

It's just
I've been doing

9

But there was a case where the warrant system was down,

10

and so the cop had to call it in and do it the old fashioned way

11

like they did.

12

have ever done otherwise.

13

to put a time limit on these things.

14

And it took 30 -- I mean, longer than it would

THE COURT:

And the Court said, We're not going

Well, and so here, the officer determined

15

to a satisfaction that Mr. McLeod had a valid driver's license

16

and a valid registration, but he never got definitive

17

information about the insurance situation --

18

MR. BOWN:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BOWN:

Right.
so he could have issued a citation.
And that's -- and that's the only problem

21

is, he did not issue the citation.

What the case law and what

22

Hansen is very clear about is, he has to issue the citation and

23

then tell -- he doesn't have to tell Mr. McLeod he's free to

24

leave, but it has to be that understanding is, the purpose of

25

your stop is over.

Could the -- the officer at that point asked
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1

all those questions?

Absolutely.

The case law's pretty clear

2

on that.

3

Paragraph 32 in the Hansen decision, where they

4

me look for this because there's -- there was a great quote, and

5

I think I've used it in my motions, but -- it is -- it's just

6

it is Paragraph 32.

7

Hansen's license and registration, completed a computer check,

8

the purpose for the initial traffic stop was concluded.

9

Officer Huntington extended the encounter by questioning Hansen

But what Hansen says is, once -- I mean, I think it's
sorry.

Let

Just said, so Officer, having "verified

Yet,

10

about whether he had alcohol, drugs, or weapons in his vehicle

11

and by asking if he could search his vehicles for these items."

12

THE COURT:

13

between Hanson and this case:

14

duration of the stop was -- first of all, the police officer

15

testified that he had determined he was going to issue a

16

warning, or he may have said he did issue a warning.

17

everything's done.

18

citation had not yet been issued, and you can -- you can talk

19

about whether or not what kind of delay happened during the

20

Terry frisk.

21

anything illegal on you?

22

search your car?

23

car, and then he found the contraband in the car.

24
25

Now, there's

In -- in

here's a distinction

In Hanson what extended the

And so

in our case by contrast, the

But in Hansen, the officer said, Do you have
The guy said, No.

And the guy said Yes.

And he said, can I

And so he searched the

In this situation we had the testimony that initially
when he, the officer, came back to the car, he said to
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1

Mr. Hansen, Do you have anything illegal on you?

2

said No.

3

He then conducted the Terry frisk.

4

Terry frisk he asked again, do you have anything illegal on you?

5

And then he said Yes.

6

probable cause exists to investigate further.

7

question is, does that moment occur before or after sort of the

8

magic end point of a reasonable time to conduct the traffic

9

investigation.

10

He said, Can I search the car?

Mr. Hansen

Mr. Hansen said Yes.

It was in the context of the

I have a syringe.

And at that moment,
And so the

The officer testified, Officer Lampshire, that it was

11

within 10 minutes, less than 10 minutes, and that about 10

12

minutes is the average time that it takes to conduct one of

13

these traffic investigations.

14

MR. BOWN:

So

But -- yeah.

But he still had to be free to

15

leave at that point.

16

the minute he starts asking him those questions.

17

I think the Terry frisk, even though nothing came out of it, it

18

extends that stop beyond what the purpose of the whole -- and

19

you go beyond that, and then he starts asking him about the

20

other things as well, so

21

THE COURT:

That's the problem is, he extends the stop
And that's why

And it's a Level II detention, so he's not

22

free to leave at any point up until the time he's arrested.

23

that's okay, as long as the investigation that is conducted is

24

within the scope of the investigation of what he had of -- of

25

the offense of which he had reasonable suspicion.
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1

MR. BOWN:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. BOWN:

Which is the traffic stop.
The traffic stop.
And the traffic stop was done.

I mean, he

4

had to be done with that.

5

not part of that.

6

worse than Hansen because he -- you're correct.

7

say I was going to give you a warning or something like that.

8

And that's why I think he hadn't done it.

9

the item -- I don't think he had given the actual paper or

10

11

The search, the request to search, is

And so what I would even say is that this is
The officer did

He hadn't given him

whatever.
But at that point, he had -- he had finished the stop,

12

and the Court still found that he had

13

detainment wasn't part of the scope of the search.

14

-- that's the thing I think the problem we run into here is,

15

it's not a time-based thing.

It's just, he's stopped him for a

16

traffic violation.

he investigates that.

17

what he's supposed to.

18

that's what he says.

19

continue with the stop be based upon the other reasonable

20

articulable suspicion.

21

why I argued

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BOWN:

He has

that it still -- the
And that's

He's done

10 minutes is sufficient to do that,
At that point it's, write a citation, or

There was nothing else there, and that's

What about the furtive movements?
Your Honor,

the case law's very clear that

24

furtive movements by themselves are not part of that.

25

it's not a basis for a Terry frisk, basically.
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~

1

something more, and there is nothing more than other than that.

2

And I would -- and your Honor may remember this.

3

to be condescending.

4

that --

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BOWN:

I'm not trying

But it's just, if you remember he said

People look for their driver's license.
Well, he told him to look for -- he said it

7

was okay to look for his driver's license, and that was when the

8

furtive movements were going on.

9

And so that's -- that's the basis, whether he stopped

So there is no basis for that.
at the

10

Terry frisk or, I think I can even say,

11

with the investigation, it was time to give him the citation and

12

let him go.

13

questions, and if he had answered those questions the same way,

14

I don't -- wouldn't have a basis for my motion.

15

was required to finish the purpose of the stop and then move on

16

from there and he didn't.

17
18

just once he was done

WJ

Could the officer have then asked him those same

THE COURT:

All right.

But the officer

Thank you very much, Mr. Bown.

Mr. Neve.
~

19

MR. NEVE:

So I actually have two different things I'd

20

like to discuss.

First, talking about what the Court has

21

already discussed.

22

believe this was a measurable extension of the stop.

23

reason I think that this was not is, my understanding of what

24

Officer Lampshire had testified -- and correct if I'm mistaken

25

since your Honor listened to it yesterday -- I believe that he

From the State's perspective, I don't
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1

was still in the process of investigating his traffic stop when

2

he noticed the defendant making the furtive moments --

3

movements, and he also noticed that his -- his -- the other

4

backup officer was interacting with him.

5

stepped out of the vehicle and went to the address the defendant

6

in regards to those movements, and so I believe that -THE COURT:

7

~

At that point he

And that raises an interesting question

8

about whether -- so probable cause arises at some point, and

9

and if the Court were to conclude that the probable cause arose

10

prior to how long it would take a reasonable officer to complete

11

the traffic stop.

12

officer is on a diversion from investigating the traffic stop.

13

And, you know, a parallel example would be -- these types of

14

detention issues come up a lot in these drug dog cases where the

15

officer is hoping, under U.S. v. Caballes, so they can get a dog

16

in there

17

MR. NEVE:

18

THE COURT:

But we, nevertheless, observed that the

The sniff of a dog.
before the -- a reasonable time period

19

elapses.

What I'm always wondering about when I look to those

20

cases is, well, maybe you did barely get the drug dog there in

21

time.

22

even investigating the traffic stop anymore, and you have

23

shifted your attention entirely over on to an investigation of

24

this drug offense and you've diverted your attention.

25

maybe the drug dog did get there within the time it would have

But during that period, there's no pretense that you're
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1

taken you to complete the traffic offense, but you have diverted

2

your attention away from it.

3

dealing with here is as extreme as that, but it is a little bit

4

of a version of that where all of a sudden, he's getting him out

5

of car, he's asking him if he has anything illegal, he's doing a

6

Terry frisk, he's asking if he can search the car, things that

7

are extending the period of time that are unrelated to the

8

investigation of the traffic offense but that maybe don't take

9

the probable cause moment beyond the reasonable time frame to

10
11

And I don't think that what we're

conduct the investigation of the traffic offense.
MR. NEVE:

Yeah.

And I see as well, your Honor.

But I

12

don't think that that would necessarily negate the initial

13

traffic stop itself or negate the probable cause that still

14

exists from that time period -- or that the officer would be

15

able to have opportunities ask those additional questions.

16

I think -- my recollection, too, is that it wasn't until the

17

defendant started making additional movements after he had asked

18

him if it was okay to search the vehicle that he then asked him

19

to step out for the Terry frisk.

20

officer-safety concern.

21

And

At that point it was an

But beyond that, I have another argument I didn't

22

actually brief, but my concern, too, is that I believe that it's

23

quite possible the officer had additional reasonable articulable

24

suspicion of another crime that was being committed because he

25

was present in that high-crime area, observed the defendant
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1

drive there, park, talk with three separate individuals who

2

pointed out the officer's presence, and then that he left

3

speaking with those individuals very quickly, and then went

4

around the corner to speak to two additional individuals, and

5

then left the

6

and 200 South so quickly that he violated the traffic rules.

7

I think that combined with the furtive moments (sic) gives the

8

officer -- furtive movements gives the officer reasonable

9

articulable suspicion that some additional potential crimes or

10

left the scene or left that area of 5th West
So

criminal activity is taking place.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. NEVE:

Okay.
So that's basically where the State's

13

arguments are.

But I do believe that the -- that the -- that

14

the motion should be denied based on (inaudible).

15

your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

17

you the last word, Mr. Bown.

18

MR. BOWN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Neve.

Thank you,

I'll give

It's your motion.

Your Honor,

just to address that alternative

19

argument that wasn't in the the briefs.

I -- I mean, I -- the

20

problem is that the officer saw everything that was going on the

21

whole time and didn't see anything, and I think he testified to

22

that.

23

there's no smoke and mirrors here.

24

investigation.

25

that's fine under the law.

I mean, we all know what the officer was doing.

I mean,

The officer was doing a drug

He just used the stop to try and do that.
We all understand that.
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1

at the end of the day, I mean, he has to

2

sword, you got to die by the sword.

3

over for the traffic offense, you got to do the traffic offense,

4

unless something else comes up.

5

helps the officers is, once they do the traffic stop, they walk

6

up to the door, and they see something else in plain view or

7

something, and then the investigation can go from there.

8

didn't happen in this case.

9

else other than that traffic violation.

if you live by the

And if you pull somebody

Usually what happens, and what

That

There was no evidence of anything
The officer testified

10

that he was done.

11

I don't think -- and -- and correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't

12

think it's a time thing.

13

happen in the time period that a usual traffic violation takes

14

place?

15

things?

16

officer could probably do it in 5; another officer could do it

17

in maybe 30 minutes, if they're using the old fashioned way.

18

But it's

19

for the traffic stop, he has to issue the citation and can't go

20

any further.

21

argument, and I'll submit it with that, your Honor.

22

And that's -- that's really the inquiry.

And

Like, you just don't say, Did it

What you do is you ask the officer, Did you do all those
And sometimes it's going to taken 10 minutes; another

it's, once they're done doing their investigation

And so it's

THE COURT:

Okay.

at the end of day, that's our

Thank you very much.

This motion

23

presents, what I believe, is a closed question.

24

deny the motion to suppress, and I'll make some findings of

25

facts, and then give some legal explanation for my ruling.
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1

The facts and circumstances relating to this motion to

2

suppress arose on the 7th of March, 2014, at approximately 200

3

South 500 West in Salt Lake City, Utah.

4

observed Mr. McLeod, the defendant, pull away after observing

5

some additional activity that will not be material to the

6

Court's ruling today.

7

pulling away without signalling, which the parties concede

8

constituted a legitimate basis to initiate a traffic stop.

9

Officer Lampshire approached Mr. McLeod in his vehicle and asked

Officer Lampshire

Officer Lampshire observed Mr. McLeod

10

him for his license, registration, and proof of insurance.

11

was unable to produce any of those things.

12

went back to his car.

13

was able to confirm that the driver's license was valid and the

14

registration was valid.

15

factual scenario that I'm describing, he as unable to determine

16

proof of valid insurance, which is a legal requirement, and

17

citation was appropriate for failure to have valid insurance.

18

He

Officer Lampshire

He called in the driver's license.

He

He was unable at any point during the

After the running the driver's license and confirming

19

its validity, Officer Lampshire came back to the vehicle and

20

leaned down and asked Mr. McLeod if he had anything illegal on

21

him.

22

alleged safety concerns, which originate from on observations

23

in part from observations from another officer who was present,

24

Officer Lampshire asked Mr. McLeod to exit the vehicle and he

25

conducted a Terry frisk of Mr. McLeod.

And Mr. McLeod stated the No at that point.

Based on

In the course of
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1

conducting that Terry frisk, he again asked Mr. McLeod whether

2

he would find anything illegal in the vehicle.

iv
3

I should back up.

After Mr. McLeod originally said No

4

to the question of Do you have anything illegal, he asked if he

5

could search the vehicle, and Mr. McLeod said Yes.

6

-- Officer Lampshire then conducted the Terry frisk.

7

course of the Terry frisk, again, asked Mr. McLeod, Will I find

8

anything illegal, and Mr. McLeod answered in the affirmative,

9

and he said "a syringe."

He then, the
And in the

Officer Lampshire continued to search

10

the vehicle.

He located the syringe that Mr. McLeod indicated

11

would be present and located some other drug paraphernalia as

12

well, which was the subject of the Motion to Suppress today.

13

he then placed Mr. McLeod under arrest for possession or use of

14

a controlled substance.

15

of the vehicle because the vehicle belonged to someone else, and

16

that person was allowed to come and retrieve it.

So
~

An inventory search was not conducted

17

And so legally this presents a certain question that

18

the Court is required to answer in order to decide whether to

19

grant or deny the motion to suppress.

20

conclude that the entire time that Mr. McLeod interacted with

21

Officer Lampshire up until time he was placed under arrest, this

22

was a Level II encounter, as the levels of police-citizen

23

encounters have been described in Utah law.

24

free to leave, and the State has not contended otherwise.

25

defendant has not contended that it was not proper to stop

Ciw

Initially, the Court will

Mr. McLeod was not
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1

Mr. Lampshire in the first place for the signal.

2

time that Mr. McLeod indicated that he had a syringe in his

3

shoe, there's no basis presented to justify either reasonable

4

suspicion or probable cause for investigation of any activity

5

beyond the traffic citation.

6

State.

7

it as explained today, but I don't think that the furtive

8

movements that were described together with what occurred prior

9

to the traffic stop arises to the level of creating reasonable

And up until

I understand the argument of the

It was not well developed in the briefs.

I understood

10

suspicion of illegal activity other than the traffic violation.

11

So the Court will confine its analysis to whether or not the

12

traffic -- the activities of the officer extended the traffic

13

stop beyond what is a reasonable period of time to conduct the

14

investigation.

15

The Court has looked at the case of State v. Hansen,

16

the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Hansen, the citation is

17

2002 Utah 125, which provides helpful guidance with respect to

18

this question.

19

that if an officer concludes a traffic stop, has finished the

20

purpose of the traffic investigation, and then asks questions

21

very similar to the questions that Officer Lampshire asked of

22

Mr. McLeod, that extending the traffic stop beyond the purpose

23

of conducting the traffic investigation, even if there is

24

consensual search that occurs at that point, constitutes a

25

constitutional violation.

That case certainly stands for the proposition
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1

Here Officer Lampshire testified that Mr. McLeod

2

responded in the affirmative to the question of whether he had

3

anything illegal on him -- and that he had a syringe in his

4

shoe -- within 10 minutes after the initial traffic stop.

5

the officer also testified that an average length of time that

6

it would take a reasonable officer, and it takes him under these

7

circumstances, to conduct a traffic stop is approximately 10

8

minutes, so it's within that time frame.

9

had continued diligently without conducting a Terry frisk,

And

If Officer Lampshire

10

without asking these questions, which led to Mr. McLeod

11

admitting that there was heroin in his shoe, he would have had

12

to write a citation, which would have taken at least as much

13

time as the Terry frisk, and the question of Do you have any

14

the two questions of Do you have anything illegal on you.

15

(i;J

And -- and so it's the Court's finding that the

16

statement of Mr. McLeod, "Yes.

17

cause to Officer Lampshire to conduct further investigation into

18

possession or use of a controlled substance, occurred within the

19

time that it would have taken to complete the traffic

20

investigation, and there was not an illegal extension of the

21

stop, unlike the situation present in the Hansen case.

22

A syringe,"

which gave probable

The Court is troubled by the fact that Officer

23

Lampshire did spend some of the time that he should have been

24

devoting his attention to conducting the traffic investigation

25

to looking at other things -- doing the Terry frisk, asking
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1

these questions about whether McLeod had illegal substances on

2

him, and diverting his attention away from the traffic

3

investigation in that fashion

4

Court does not find that that diversion extended the length of

5

the stop beyond the length of the time it would have taken to

6

write the citation if he had proceeded through to write the

7

citation for the lack of insurance.

8
9

is troubling to Court, but the

Once there was probable cause to investigate further,
the issue of possession or use of controlled substance, and I'll

10

find probable cause existed based on Mr. McLeod's affirmative

11

answer that Yes,

12

question then becomes whether or not, in the scope of conducting

13

that investigation, it was appropriate to search the vehicle.

14

It was not an inventory search incident to arrest because the

15

vehicle was taken by someone else, so I think the Court does

16

need to look at the question of whether or not the consent to

17

search the car was voluntary.

18

Office Lampshire's testimony indicates that he asked Mr. McLeod

19

if he could search the car.

20

testimony to suggest that he intimated to Mr. McLeod that he had

21

the right to search the car or could search the car without Mr.

22

McLeod's consent.

23

given by Mr. McLeod that you can go ahead and conduct the

24

search.

25

convince the Court that there was anything involuntary or

I have something illegal.

A syringe.

The

There was nothing about his

And the answer was unqualified and freely

And so there was nothing presented in the testimony to
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1

coerced about the search of the vehicle.

2

And so the Court will find that the search of the vehicle was

3

conducted with appropriate consent, it was voluntarily given,

4

and the contraband that was found in connection with that search

5

is admissible.

6

And I'll ask you, Mr. Neve, to prepare findings of facts and

7

conclusions of law with respect to the Court's ruling today.

~

And so that motion to suppress will be denied.

8

MR. NEVE:

9

THE COURT:

10

Thank you, your Honor.
All right.

Why don't we, then, turn our

attention to the other motion, Mr. Bown.

11

MR. BOWN:

Your Honor,

in that case,

I think the way

12

Mr. Neve kind of looked at it was that, first,

13

probable cause for what occurred that day in the park.

14

I'm not -- we're not arguing the case law that you gave us that

15

day .

16

there was
I mean,

That ' s
THE COURT:

This is the case that I was really thinking

17

about when I asked you the look at the Devenpeck case and the

18

possessions -- or, no, the Applegate case --

19

MR. BOWN:

Yeah.

It's established that even though if

20

the officer is incorrect in his assessment of why he's arresting

21

the person, if there is actual probable cause of a crime being

22

committed, and he gets it wrong, he can arrest him.

23

question in that regard.

24
25

THE COURT:

There's no

And you would -- you acknowledge what the

officer testified to, he -- he -- he saw everything.
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